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INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, there were 149 million Internet users in the United 
States and 544 million worldwide.1  This number is projected to 
increase to 186 million and 945 million, respectively, by 2004; and 
230 million and 1.47 billion, respectively, by 2007.2 
Since only 9.5 million homes have high-speed Internet access, 
it can be inferred that the majority of these users are operating, at a 
maximum, with 56k modems.3  Without broadband, 4 it takes 
 
1 See Internet User Forecast by Country tbl. 1.4, at http://www.eTForecasts.com/ 
products/ES_intusersv2.htm (last modified Dec. 7, 2002). 
2 See id. tbl. 1.1 (demonstrating an average increase of about twenty percent per year 
worldwide). 
3 See Pamela McClintock, Valenti Sees ‘Peril’ in U.S. Copyright Fight, DAILY 
VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A9 (noting that Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion 
Picture Association of America [MPAA], estimates that only 9.5 million homes have 
high-speed Internet access). 
4 Broadband is defined by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission [FCC] as a 
service that offers more than 200 kbps in any one direction. See F.C.C., INQUIRY 
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between twelve and fourteen hours to download a full-length 
feature film, so at the present time it is not entirely feasible for the 
majority of users to rent films over the Internet.5  With broadband, 
however, it takes as little as twenty-five to thirty minutes; in the 
future this figure should decrease to a mere forty-five seconds.6  
Additionally, Qualcomm is developing the technology and 
establishing a uniform standard to link computers to television sets 
so that consumers will be able to watch downloaded videos on 
their home theater systems instead of their computer monitors.7  In 
only a few years, most netizens8 will be renting videos over the 
Internet to watch on big screen TV. 
But who will provide the service?  How much will they 
charge?  And, most importantly for the film industry, how will the 
revenues be determined for profit participants?  These are some of 
the most critical questions facing today’s entertainment attorney, 
and their resolution surely will be the subject of hotly contested 
litigation in the not-too-distant future. 
Part I of this Article defines profit participation and argues that 
in-house Internet home video distribution will deprive writers, 
directors, producers, and actors (hereinafter cumulatively “Talent”) 
of their earnings because studios surely will use biased reporting 
procedures.  Part II examines the basis for this bias by discussing 
how studio in-house Internet home video distribution may 
eliminate the independent reporting procedures of content 
aggregators.  This section compares the efficiency and desirability 
of traditional distribution models to the new Internet model, and 
argues that although there is a reasoned economic need for such 
 
CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO ALL 
AMERICANS IN A REASONABLE AND TIMELY FASHION, AND POSSIBLE STEPS TO 
ACCELERATE SUCH DEPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 706 OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, THIRD REPORT 7–8 (2002), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-33A1.pdf. 
5 See McClintock, supra note 3. 
6 See id. 
7 Gary Garland, Address at the 26th UCLA Entertainment Law Symposium (Jan. 25, 
2002). 
8 People who use the Internet. See Netizen, Netlingo at http://www.netlingo.com/ 
right.cfm?term=netizen (Netizen: “A citizen of the Internet, as in, one who spends a 
significant amount of time online or is an experienced user of the Net.”). 
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distribution, it will be prejudicial to profit participants who should 
protect themselves through the following alternatives: independent 
auditing, litigation, or collective bargaining that mandates 
arbitration.  Additionally, the government must vigorously enforce 
antitrust law, because the recent trend of vertical integration by 
large media companies has deprived profit participants of 
meaningful negotiating power and the ability to collect their 
contractual earnings.  Part III further discusses the antitrust 
implications of this new video distribution model and argues that 
in-house studio distribution of home video will be anathema to the 
sound public policy of protecting weaker bargaining parties and 
ensuring that contracting parties receive the benefit of their 
bargain.  Part IV discusses how Internet distribution threatens both 
studios and profit participants by making videos vulnerable to 
widespread piracy, with the resulting losses surely passed on to 
profit participants.  This Article concludes that fundamental 
change is necessary in order to protect profit participants from the 
potential abuse that in-house Internet distribution of home video 
presents to film studios. 
I. TALENT PARTICIPATIONS DEFINED 
In the entertainment industry, Talent creates works for hire that 
a studio owns, and for which “they are paid fixed and contingent 
compensation.”9  The principal form of contingent compensation is 
the profit participation provision. 
The modern version of the profit participation began in 1950, 
when Hollywood went from a “studio system” of weekly player 
contracts, or per-picture salaries, to percentages of so-called 
“profit” pools.10  At that time, Jimmy Stewart agreed to forego his 
fixed compensation for Winchester ’73, in exchange for a “back-
end” (after the film is released) profit participation of fifty percent 
of the net profits resulting from the studio’s exploitation of the 
film.  Unfortunately, the film was not a commercial success and 
 
9 BILL DANIELS ET AL., MOVIE MONEY 211 (1998). 
10 Id. at 202 (quoting Mel Sattler, former head of Universal Studios’s business affairs 
department). 
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Mr. Stewart received no money for his work.11  Initially,  then, the 
earliest form of a profit participation was a venture in which Talent 
alone shouldered the risk when the film failed, but was well- 
rewarded when it succeeded. 
Since that time, profit participation has evolved into a sum 
granted in addition to fixed compensation.  Therefore, studios now 
bear more of the risk, because they must pay the fixed 
compensation even if a film fails, and they must share their profits 
if the film succeeds.  Talent, however, still bears some risk because 
Talent will often accept a lower fixed salary up-front for a larger 
slice of the profits on the back-end.  Consequently, figures such as 
Mr. Stewart’s fifty percent profit participation share no longer 
exist.  The norm for current profit sharing provisions varies 
between one and fifteen percent depending upon the Talent’s 
ability to draw an audience.12 
This mutual risk arrangement is designed to produce mutual 
reward, but does it?  In the film industry, modern profit 
participation provisions are formulaic and often attached to 
agreements as the studio’s Exhibit “A.”  Although the terms are 
boilerplate, or standard, the provisions are actually creatures of 
contract.  Typically, parties exercising independent will and free 
choice negotiate contractual provisions; however, this is not the 
case in an industry where only seven key players control the purse 
strings.13  In such a restrictive environment, contractual provisions 
are rarely, if ever, negotiated, and any alterations will result from 
the Talent’s relative bargaining strength.14 
Nevertheless, profit participations are highly desirable because 
they confer bragging rights upon the Talent who receive them, 
enabling them to reap future windfalls that can be worth millions if 
 
11 See id. at 202–203. 
12 See id. at 204.  Ironically, profit participations only go to the most powerful Talent, 
usually the top five percent of all working actors; however, one definition of a net 
participant is one who “wishes they had more leverage.” See id. at 297. 
13 The seven major studios are Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Paramount Pictures 
Corporation, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation, and Universal Studios Inc., Walt Disney Company, and Warner Brothers. 
See MPAA, at http://www.mpaa.org/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003). 
14 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 208, 211–12, 226. 
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the motion picture becomes a commercial success.15  Since Talent 
wants profit participation, and entertainment attorneys spend 
endless hours agonizing over how profit participation is defined, it 
is necessary for an entertainment attorney to have a proper 
understanding of the terms and drafting.  Here are a few of the 
fundamentals. 
A. Net Profits: The Big Picture 
Talent participation is based on net profits.  Net profits are not 
mandated by statute, as are tax calculations,16 or agreed upon by 
the guilds, as are residuals.17  Net profits, like Talent participations, 
are creatures of contract.18  There are essentially four definitions of 
studio net profits: (1) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), for reporting earnings to the SEC, shareholders, and 
lenders; (2) calculating income and loss for tax reporting to the 
Internal Revenue Service; (3) calculating cash available for 
distribution to equity holders of the film company, and (4) 
calculating payments to profit participants.19  In their simplest 
form, each accounting method essentially boils down to the 
following model: gross revenues – (distribution fees + distribution 
expenses + negative cost) = net profits.20 
B. Net Profits: Breakout 
1. Gross Revenues 
Gross revenues are all revenues received from a film in all 
media, minus off-the-top expenses such as (1) conversion costs,21 
 
15 See id. at 210–11, 249. 
16 See SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ 120 (2000). 
17 See, e.g., WRITERS GUILD OF AM., THEATRICAL AND TELEVISION BASIC AGREEMENT 
art. 65, at 350–96 (1998). 
18 See MOORE, supra note 16. 
19 See id. at 117–22. 
20 See id. 
21 Bank costs incurred when converting foreign currency into domestic currency. See 
DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 231. 
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(2) theater checking,22 (3) collections,23 (4) residuals to talent 
guilds,24 (5) trade dues,25 (6) licenses,26 (7) taxes,27 and (8) theater- 
level advertising.28 
2. Distribution Fees 
Distribution fees are the fees charged by the studio/distributor 
to distribute a film in a given territory.  These fees are usually 
charged as a percentage of revenue from the designated market and 
vary between ten and fifty percent depending on the producer’s 
relative bargaining power.29 
3. Distribution Expenses 
Distribution expenses are the costs associated with distributing 
a film.  Distribution expenses include, to relative degrees, each of 
the following: advertisements and promotions,30 release prints,31 
 
22 To ensure accurate box office reporting, studios hire theater checkers to actually sit 
in the theater and do a head count. See, e.g., Certified Reports, Inc., at http://www. 
certifiedreports.com/TheatreServices.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2003). 
23 The cost of collecting fees from and auditing distributors. See DANIELS ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 231. 
24 Talent guilds include the Directors Guild of America [DGA], Screen Actors Guild 
[SAG], and Writers Guild of America [WGA], though residuals are also payable to 
below-the-line (everyone other than the director, writer, producer, or star) guilds such as 
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees [IATSE], under various 
collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 162–66, 232. 
25 A trade is an organization, such as the MPAA, responsible for protecting and 
promoting the interests of an industry.  They do so by lobbying for protectionist 
legislation, especially in regard to antitrust matters, discussed infra Part III.  Their fees 
are subject to a cap of $75,000. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 232. 
26 Fees, including censorship payments to foreign film boards. See DANIELS ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 232. 
27 Revenue taxes including foreign withholding taxes. See id. at 232–33. 
28 This is a typical studio “give,” meaning it will be negotiated out if requested. See id. 
at 230–33. 
29 See id. at 295. 
30 Recent totals for advertising and promotion: 1997 (22.7 million), 1999 (28 million), 
2001 (30 million).  Studios define this term broadly, including: 
Advance screenings, market research focus groups, and market tracking 
studies; 
Network television (the most expensive part of the ad campaign, the cost of 
which local exhibitors do not share); 
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taxes,32 residuals,33 bad debt,34 and other miscellaneous expenses 
such as editing costs due to censorship, duties, theater checking, 
special titles, legal expenses, and settlements.35 
 
Cooperative advertising (ad costs shared by the distributor and exhibitor which 
are negotiable, and may include all media, some media, or only in-theater 
standees (standing cardboard figures)); 
Trade Ads (ads taken in trade magazines such as the Hollywood Reporter or 
Daily Variety, which are used to stroke Talent egos, attract foreign distributors, 
get exhibitors to increase bids for films, and drive up the secondary market 
price of a film); 
Four Walling (releasing film theater-by-theater rather than according to a 
general release plan); 
Sneak Previews (such previews include the director’s sneak (for which the 
producer and distributor must agree in accordance with standards set by the 
DGA), the trade sneak (done mostly for Talent ego and sales, as described 
above for Trade Ads), and the word- of-mouth sneak (to generate enthusiasm 
among fans); 
Advance Ads (ads that do not include theater names, merely the title of film or 
star); 
Theater Ads (including trailers, marquee, standees, and one sheets); 
Billboards and Busses; 
Publicity (otherwise known as the art of coaxing media into promoting for free, 
though a studio may have to pay for Talent to go to a publicity screening 
(including hotel, air fare, car rentals, and per diem)), or for field promotion 
(where the studio pays the salaries of fieldpeople (independent agency 
employees, or employees of the distributor in charge of “local publicity”) 
which are separately chargeable, while ad personnel’s salaries usually are not). 
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 142–43.  Publicity may also include 
featurettes, otherwise known as Electronic Press Kits [EPKs], that show how 
the film was made.  Revenue generated from EPKs should be offset against 
charges, but this is generally not done because it would be difficult and costly 
for the profit participant’s auditors to locate; 
Overhead (most distributors charge ten percent of total ad expense as a 
contractual overhead amount). 
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 113–47; MOORE, supra note 16, at 343, 360–61. 
31 The cost of release prints includes the film elements, the freight, and dubbing costs.  
Generally, costs incurred prior to the final answer print are considered production costs 
(subject to an overhead charge), while costs incurred afterward are considered 
distribution expenses. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 149–54; MOORE, supra note 
16, at 362. 
32 Income taxes are not chargeable to a production, though the studio may charge sales, 
withholding, and remittance taxes. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 155–60; MOORE, 
supra note 16, at 137, 362–63. 
33 Residuals are a distribution expense, triggered only if a film is distributed beyond its 
initial theatrical release. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 161–66; MOORE, supra note 
16, at 362. 
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4. Negative Cost 
The negative cost is the cost of getting the film “in the can” 
(i.e., completing the film up through obtaining a final cut negative, 
but not including release prints, which are more properly deducted 
as a distribution expense).36  Another way of looking at negative 
cost is to view it as the final production budget of the film, after 
adjustments for actual costs. 
Negative costs include, but are not limited to, the production 
cost,37 studio overhead of roughly fifteen percent of the direct cost 
of production, gross participations before breakeven (i.e., when 
gross receipts = distribution fees + distribution expenses + 
production costs + interest), interest (usually charged at 125 
percent of the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR), and 
which may be added on to overhead and also charged against 
unrecouped production costs, but not unrecouped distribution 
expenses), and deferments (which may be contingent (on profits) 
or non-contingent (upon completion of principal photography or 
upon acquiring a distributor).38  The important distinction for profit 
participants between distribution fees and distribution expenses is 
that the studio may charge overhead on distribution costs, but not 
on fees, and this interest charge is always higher than the actual 
cost of funds.39  Profit participations are also included as 
production costs so that the studio may charge interest and the 
overhead fee on them to deduct these charges before making any 
payments.40 
 
34 Bad debt is an uncollectable film rental fee, and should generally not be reported as a 
distribution expense. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 168; MOORE, supra note 16, at 
362. 
35 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 169–70; MOORE, supra note 16, at 360–64. 
36 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 153. 
37 Including (1) the cost of abandoned ideas, (2) facility charges for use of studio back 
lots and production offices, (3) payroll tax and fringes varying between twenty-five and 
forty percent of the salaries of studio and guild employees (and which studios will 
calculate at the highest rate even though actual amount paid is less), and (4) completion 
guarantees between three and six percent of the budget (if necessary). See DANIELS ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 179–90. 
38 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 190–200. 
39 See MOORE, supra note 16, at 138. 
40 See id. 
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C. Net Profits: Two Models for Home Video 
Net profits for home video are determined on either a license 
fee or a royalty model.41 
1. The License Fee Model 
The license fee model follows the traditional net profit formula 
discussed supra Part I.A.1: gross profits – (distribution fees + 
distribution expenses + negative cost).  Typically, studios will levy 
a distribution fee between thirty-five and forty-five, which is 
similar to a theatrical distribution fee.42 
2. The Three Royalty Models: Sell-Through, Revenue Share, 
and Rental 
Royalty models are a convenient means by which a studio can 
get around the myriad deductions of the License Fee model by 
simply reporting to the profit participant a flat percentage of gross 
income from wholesale distribution.43  At some point in every 
case, varying with the numbers, the license fee model and royalty 
model for home video will meet;44 profit participants should, 
therefore, hire a savvy attorney who is adept at choosing which 
model will produce the most income. 
Royalty models for video distribution fall into three categories: 
sell-through, revenue share, or rental.45  Given that the intention of 
a studio is to calculate and report net profits as low as possible, it is 
not surprising to find that studios have defined royalties in terms 
that allow them to categorically reduce gross receipts from video 
sales, the single largest element of gross receipts, by eighty percent 
or more.46 
 
41 Wayne Levin, Address at Southwestern University School of Law (Feb. 2002). 
42 See id. 
43 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 296. 
44 A good rule of thumb is somewhere between a thirty-seven percent royalty and a 
twenty-two percent distribution fee. 
45 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 61–62. 
46 See MOORE, supra note 16, at 135. 
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a) Sell-through 
Sell-through defines the market in which the studio delivers 
videocassettes to retail outlets for sale directly to consumers at the 
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (approximately $29.95).47  
Royalties in this market are the lowest and vary between ten and 
fifteen percent.48 
b) Revenue Share 
Revenue Share defines the market in which videos are 
delivered to retailers at a reduced price and in which the gross 
profits are split fifty-fifty with the studio, which allows for a 
slightly higher royalty of approximately eighteen percent.49 
c) Rental 
Rental is the market in which videos are sold to retailers for 
rental to consumers in exchange for a higher royalty of 
approximately twenty to thirty percent.50 
3. Conclusion: The Three Royalty Models Underscore the 
Need for Accurate and Enforceable Reporting at a Higher 
Royalty Rate 
The current royalty models effectively allow a studio to take a 
seventy-five to ninety-five percent distribution fee without 
accounting for costs.51  While this fee was initially fair, because 
higher royalties were needed to help pay for developing and 
marketing a new secondary market, they are now onerous and 
excessive because all the associated costs have decreased, lowering 
the cost of duplicating, marketing and distributing a video cassette 
from forty dollars to three dollars.52  The studios, however, cling to 
 
47 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 62. 
48 See Harris E. Tulchin, Licensing Motion Pictures in the International Marketplace, 
at http://www.medialawyer.com/LICEART.htm (1999). 
49 See WAYNE LEVIN, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION LAW 32 (2002). 
50 See Tulchin, supra note 48. 
51 The distribution fee is essentially the reverse of the royalty fee, i.e., when the 
distributor pays a royalty of between eight and twenty-five percent, she is, in effect, 
charging a distribution fee of between seventy-five and ninety-two percent. 
52 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 65. 
8 - GATIEN FORMAT 5/12/03  8:52 AM 
2003] INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION AND PROFITS 921 
these antiquated standards for three reasons: first, because they 
can; second, because increasing the royalty for one retailer would 
likely increase the royalty for all based on “most favored nations”53 
provisions in standard distributor contracts; and third, because of 
concerns that higher royalties will incur higher across-the-board 
payments to guilds.54  To aggravate matters further, distribution 
expenses are now creeping back in, reducing the royalty even 
further to approximately eight to twelve percent, regardless of the 
model chosen.55 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION: TWO 
WAYS IN WHICH INTERNET DISTRIBUTION WILL AFFECT PROFIT 
PARTICIPANTS 
Internet distribution presents a monolithic problem for the film 
industry, and for profit participants and their attorneys, because it 
is not clear to anyone drafting these agreements exactly where 
Internet revenue will fall under current guild agreements.56  One 
certainty, however, is that the Talent’s share of profit participation 
will be reduced in two ways.  First, when studios take distribution 
“in-house” (meaning they do it themselves) there will be little, if 
any, independent oversight, which will lead to under-reporting.  
Second, when films are distributed online they will be increasingly 
vulnerable to piracy, with the resulting losses surely passed on to 
profit participants in the form of write-downs. 
 
53 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64 n.15 (“A ‘most favored nations clause’ . . . 
basically states, ‘if anyone else ever gets a better deal, then I get that same better deal.’”). 
54 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64. 
55 See id. at 66–68. 
56 See Zane B. Melmed, The Role of the Studio Lawyer in the New Media Age, 8 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 169, 178 (2001). 
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A. How In-House Studio Distribution of Home Video May 
Eliminate the Need for Content Aggregators and Lead to 
Underreporting 
1. The Traditional Home Video Distribution Model 
Under the traditional home video distribution model, content 
aggregators57 distributed videos to the public.  Content aggregators 
include businesses such as Blockbuster Entertainment, Hollywood 
Video, and neighborhood video stores, which receive and 
distribute videos from multiple sources. 
2. Benefits of Content Aggregators: Independent Reporting 
Content aggregators provide multiple consumer benefits: a 
wide range of films (not just films from one studio), geographical 
proximity and convenience, and competitive prices.  For Talent, 
the most important benefit of content aggregators is that they 
provide independent reporting of gross receipts,58 because content 
aggregators are not exclusive distributors of a single studio’s 
product.59 
3. Detriments of Content Aggregators: Increased Cost 
Studios dislike doing business with content aggregators, but 
view them as necessary evils.  First, content aggregators are 
necessary because consumers will not drive to different studio 
stores, where each store carries only that studio’s films.  
 
57 “A content aggregator is an individual or organization that gathers Web content 
(and/or sometimes applications) from different online sources for reuse or resale.” 
Content Aggregator, Search Web Services, at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/ 
sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci815047,00.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2003). 
58 Although detailed reports are available by paid subscription only, limited reporting 
of gross receipts for video rentals is available to the public through Hollywood Reporter, 
at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hollywoodreporter/charts/rental_display.jsp (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2003) (listing of weekly top ten available without paid subscription), 
Video Store Magazine, at http://www.videostoremag.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2003) 
(listing of weekly top ten available without paid subscription), and Video Business, at 
http://www.videobusiness.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2003) (listing of weekly top three 
available without paid subscription). 
59 This is true even though they may be owned by a single studio; e.g., Blockbuster and 
Paramount are both subsidiaries of Viacom. 
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Consumers would not know where to go, making it extremely 
inconvenient for them to find movies, and the selection would be 
limited.  Second, content aggregators are evil, as far as studios are 
concerned, because they increase the studios’ cost of doing 
business and lower the studios’ profit margin.  Content aggregators 
increase the studios’ cost of doing business by imposing 
independent reporting and auditing requirements, and they lower 
the studios’ profit margins because studios must split profits under 
the revenue sharing models discussed supra in Part I.C.60 
4. Why Content Aggregators May Be Eliminated 
Much to the studios’ delight, Internet video distribution 
threatens to abolish the need for content aggregators because it will 
radically change the way consumers rent motion pictures.  Instead 
of going to local video stores, consumers will be able to do a title 
search on the web, go to the studio website, and download the film.  
Portal sites61 may also allow a user to select films according to 
genre and then link to a studio site, in which case a studio would 
likely pay the website between one and thirty cents for referrals 
leading to consumer rentals.62 
Clearly, content aggregators will seek to continue distributing 
films online.  Although initial efforts to start an Internet venture 
between Blockbuster and Enron failed,63 Blockbuster has had some 
success in securing limited video-on-demand rights from 
Universal.64  Furthermore, Blockbuster’s president of e-commerce 
has stated that Blockbuster is firmly committed to “deliver[ing] 
 
60 See David Bloom, Blockbuster and Enron Blow Out, Red Herring, at 
http://www.redherring.com/industries/2001/0326/1730018373.html (Mar. 26, 2001) 
(“Blockbuster . . . generates more than half of Hollywood’s domestic income.”). 
61 A site that aggregates links to other sites and allows users to hyperlink to those sites. 
62 This estimate is based on current search engine models such as Overture.com.  
Overture.com is premised on a unique business model, whereby advertisers bid for key 
words such as “tee shirt,” and the highest bidder receives priority ranking in the listings. 
See http://www.overture.com/d/USm/about/news/glance.jhtml (last visited Feb. 19, 
2003). 
63 See Bloom, supra note 60. 
64 See Cecily Barnes, Blockbuster Rolls Film on Video-on-Demand, CNet News, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-253242.html?tag=bplst (Feb. 27, 2001). 
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movies to people at home however they want to receive them.”65  
With this hope in mind, Karen Raskopf, a spokeswoman for 
Blockbuster, stated “[w]e are continuing to talk with the studios 
and no studios have told us no.”66 
However, not saying “no” doesn’t mean “yes,” especially when 
the stakes are as lucrative as the $18 billion video rental market.67  
In fact, initial discussions between Blockbuster (eighty-two percent 
owned by Viacom)68 and its corporate cousin Paramount Studios 
(also owned by Viacom)69 failed when the parties couldn’t agree to 
a deal, with one insider stating that “Hollywood isn’t about to give 
Blockbuster another blank check.”70 
5. How Eliminating Content Aggregators May Affect Profit 
Participants 
Although this change in the distribution model may be 
insignificant, if not more convenient, for consumers, it poses a 
significant problem for profit participants who rely on the 
independence of content aggregators’ accounting.  If studios no 
longer have to distribute films through content aggregators, they 
will be free (1) to set the video rental price, (2) to set the video 
royalty rate posted to gross receipts, and (3) to report the number 
of videos rented. 
The studios have already taken the initial steps.  On November 
11, 2002, five of the seven major film studios announced their joint 
venture, Movielink71 (the antitrust implications are discussed in 
Part III.B infra).  Under the present model, a consumer can rent a 
film online which will be viewable on his home computer for as 
little as $1.99–$3.99 per picture for up to one month; however, 
once the film has been started, it is only available for twenty-four 
 
65 Top 25 Click and Mortar Executives, Internet World, at http://www.internetworld. 
com/magazine.php?inc=060100/6.01cover2.html (June 1, 2000). 
66 Reuters, Studios in Talks to Sell Movies on the Web, Industry Standard, at 
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,20510,00.html (Nov. 30, 2000). 
67 See Bloom, supra note 60. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See http://www.movielink.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2003). 
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hours before it is permanently erased.72  Most likely as a result of 
piracy fears (discussed in Part IV infra), the studios are initially 
releasing slightly more than 170 titles.73 
Because of the present technological inability of average 
consumers to watch the films on television, and also the competing 
video-on-demand and DVD markets, immediate criticism has been 
leveled at this means of distribution.74 That said, the studios hope 
this arrangement will prove attractive because of the low cost, ease 
of use, and absence of late fees.75 
Experts have speculated that the most probable model will be 
either direct distribution or an inter-company license through a 
closely held affiliate.76  Direct distribution will give the studios 
ultimate authority over the rates, as well as how receipts are added 
and reported.  This presents the problem, however, of “at source” 
reporting.  “At source” reporting occurs when income is recorded 
where it is received.  In other words, if a studio receives the money 
directly, then it must calculate the amount owed to profit 
participants and post it directly into gross receipts without any 
 
72 See Chris Marlowe & Paul Bond, Studios Unreeling Web Distrib’n: Quintet 
Movielink Bows Today Amid Mixed Expectations, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 11, 2002, at 8 
(noting that studios generally set prices at about $4.00); Dawn C. Chmielewski, Major 
Studios to Launch Net Movie Rentals, Mercury News,  at http://www.siliconvalley.com/ 
mld/ siliconvalley/4492236.htm (Nov. 11, 2002) (“Pricing and terms are set by individual 
studios, with rental fees ranging from $1.99 to $4.95.”). 
73 See id. 
74 See Marlowe & Bond, supra note 72 (quoting Mark Kersey, broadband analyst for 
ARS, Inc., as stating that “Internet movies-on-demand will remain a niche market for the 
foreseeable future,” and quoting Josh Bernoff, Forrester Research principal analyst, as 
stating that linking television to a wireless network “is just too much tinkering for Joe 
Sixpack”); Ben Fritz, The Next Big Internet Flop, Slate, at http://www.msnbc.com/ 
news/834034.asp (Nov. 12, 2002) (“The press clippings had better be glowing, because 
as a business, Movielink provides a product for which there is almost no demand.”). 
75 Cf. Risky Business? New On-Demand Digital Movies May Not Be Pirate Proof, 
TechTV, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/techtv_digimovie010820. 
html (Aug. 20, 2001).  Recently, Blockbuster has implemented a new plan aimed at 
encouraging more rentals by reducing late fees, allowing customers to pay a subscription 
fee between $19.99 and $24.99 per month for unlimited rentals. See Stefanie Olsen, CNet 
News, Blockbuster Takes Aim at Netflix, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-949024.html 
(Aug. 8, 2002). 
76 See Schuyler M. Moore, Release of Films on the Internet Gives Rise to Novel Legal 
Issues, ENT. L. & FIN., Dec. 1999, at 3. 
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further deductions.  This would result in more money for profit 
participants and less for the studio. 
Therefore, it is more likely that studios will distribute through 
an inter-company license with a wholly-owned subsidiary.  This 
model gives the appearance of propriety while still allowing the 
studios to legally redistribute profits to their affiliate, and away 
from profit participants, by entering into agreements that favor 
their affiliate-licensees.  Under this model, the “source” is the 
affiliate, not the studio, and thus more deductions can be taken 
before posting earnings from Internet distribution to gross 
receipts.77 
This granting of rights among closely held corporations occurs 
now more than ever, as vertically integrated studios create their 
own programs and then license and distribute them through 
affiliates.78  It has caused an industry-wide panic among Talent and 
Talent representatives, because it allows the licensee (which has no 
contractual obligation to Talent) to earn the lion’s share of the 
profits while the studio posts reduced figures to the profit 
participation pool shared by Talent, thus permitting a studio to 
legally avoid its contractual obligation to share profits.79 
One result of this pro-studio/anti-Talent licensing scheme was 
the high-profile failure of a proposed NBC sitcom because its 
producer could not ensure a fair market return on the series.80  In 
that dispute, Adam Sandler’s Happy Madison production company 
pulled out of negotiations with NBC for its Norm Macdonald–Jon 
Lovitz buddy comedy because Sandler couldn’t prevent the studio 
from cutting a sweetheart affiliate deal that would diminish his 
profit participation windfall if the sitcom became successful.81  At 
the heart of the dispute was the studio’s recent revision in its 
 
77 See id. 
78 See John Dempsey, April Fills Cablers with Ratings Thrills, VARIETY, May 6–12, 
2002, at 36 (quoting Brad Adgate, senior vice president and director of research for 
Horizon Media: “Vertical integration has changed the model.  It’s not broadcast vs. cable 
any more, it’s media conglomerate vs. media conglomerate.”). 
79 See Janet Shprintz, Self-Dealing Sets Backend Furor, VARIETY, Sept. 20–26, 1999, at 
4. 
80 See Cynthia Littleton, Self-Dealing Pains TV Biz: Talent, Studios Battle Over Back-
End Deals, HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 21, 2001, at 1, 41. 
81 See id. 
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contractual language, replacing the studio’s obligation to secure 
fair market value for the program with a provision to negotiate in 
good faith.82  This alteration was based upon the studio’s unilateral 
assessment that “fair market value is a difficult, if not impossible, 
standard to determine in the current media landscape, where media 
giants are doing more and more internal business and the pool of 
potential buyers is shrinking.”83  However, such a provision 
effectively eviscerates the rights of profit participants because it is 
so subjective.  Essentially, the studio replaced a standard that was 
difficult to determine with one that was wholly unenforceable 
without litigation, and solely within its discretion. 
NBC has since revised this provision to stipulate that the studio 
must “secure fees in line with the amount the studio would in a 
transaction with an unaffiliated buyer for a comparable 
program.”84  However, under the current trend of deregulation, it is 
not likely that such a value could be determined, because nearly all 
studios are licensing to affiliated companies.85  Therefore, this 
form of self-dealing through transfer pricing in affiliated 
transactions is an industry-wide issue that has become “grist for 
numerous lawsuits in recent years as consolidation and vertical 
integration [have] yielded media behemoths that house production 
and network entities under one corporate roof.”86 
So far, the lawsuits that have been filed against the studios 
have settled87 based upon the studios’ fear that they would be 
required to disclose their confidential license fee agreements.88  
Nevertheless, settlements only protect Talent powerful enough to 
sue without fearing that a backlash from the studio might end their 
 
82 See id. 
83 Id. at 41. 
84 Id. 
85 See Shprintz, supra note 79. 
86 See Littleton, supra note 80, at 1. 
87 See id. at 41 (citing lawsuits against Twentieth Century Fox TV over profits from the 
shows NYPD Blue and The X-Files based on licensing arrangements between Fox 
Broadcasting Co. and its FX cable network; a lawsuit by Barry Levinson and Tom 
Fontana over profits from Homicide: Life on the Street; and a lawsuit by the creators of 
Home Improvement). 
88 See id. (stating that studio executives equate discovery with blackmail because 
plaintiffs can subpoena confidential license fee agreements). 
8 - GATIEN FORMAT 5/12/03  8:52 AM 
928 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:909 
career.89  Furthermore, studios are already nipping lawsuits in the 
bud by inserting new contractual language effectively spelling out 
the rights of the studio to sell to an affiliate, as well as engage in a 
self-dealing transaction, with all disputes subject to mandatory 
binding private arbitration.90  This is hardly a solution to the 
problem, since private arbitration will keep disputes out of the 
public eye, limit discovery, and not be subject to appeal.91 
If past behavior is any indication, studios will neither be honest 
nor forthcoming when providing statements to profit participants.92  
 
89 See id. (quoting veteran entertainment litigator Stanton “Larry” Stein, who stated 
“most of the talent involved just doesn’t have the clout to say ‘no’ because they won’t get 
their projects picked up”). 
90 See Shprintz, supra note 79. 
91 See MOORE, supra note 16, at 188. 
92 Some noteworthy examples of Hollywood’s untrustworthiness are: 
• In November 2002, the California Court of Appeals let potentially devastating 
jury instructions stand following appeal by the Walt Disney Company. See 
Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. B153920 , 2002 WL 31590870 
(Cal. Ct. App. filed Nov. 20, 2002); Janet Shprintz, Winnie Ruling Wallops 
Disney, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 21, 2002, at 1, 24.  The case involved damages that 
could amount to $1 billion resulting from Disney’s promise to pay videocassette 
royalties to the Slesinger family, which has held North American rights to Winnie 
the Pooh since the 1960s.  The court found that “Disney misused the pretrial 
discovery process by destroying evidence it knew or should have known was 
sought by SSI [including a file marked “Pooh-Legal Problems”], making false and 
evasive responses to SSI’s discovery, and unduly delaying notification about the 
records destruction.” Slesinger, 2002 WL 31590870, at *2.  Consequently, by 
applying a jury instruction “as to the suppression, concealment, and destruction of 
evidence”, the court let stand jury instructions permitting the jury to find that the 
representations regarding royalties had been made, that Disney was prohibited 
from introducing evidence disputing SSI’s version of statements attributed to 
Disney, and allowing the jury to find that such representations were knowingly 
false when made. Id.  Notwithstanding Slesinger, Disney had the chutzpah to 
separately negotiate an agreement with the heirs of the Pooh books author and 
illustrator in a move that would allow Disney to reclaim the merchandising rights 
from the Slesinger family—this agreement is being separately contested. See 
Shprintz, supra at 79. 
• In November 2002, legendary comic book creator Stan Lee filed suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York because Marvel Comics 
claimed that, despite the $800 million in worldwide box office sales, SPIDER-MAN 
(Columbia Pictures 2002) had not generated a profit. See Carl DiOrio, Lee’s 
‘Spider’ Suit: Case vs. Marvel Turns on Licensing Profits, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 
13, 2002, at 8. 
• In 1995, Winston Groom, the writer of FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 
1994), publicly complained that Paramount had not paid him a single penny of his 
8 - GATIEN FORMAT 5/12/03  8:52 AM 
2003] INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION AND PROFITS 929 
Commenting on the creative practices underlying “Hollywood 
Accounting,” one industry insider has said his mentor at 
“Universal kept no fewer than five sets of books for any given 
production,” while another swears with equal vehemence that 
Universal kept “only a single set of books . . . for any given 
purpose.”93  Semantics aside, the principal question that taking 
video distribution in-house poses to profit participants and that 
Talent will litigate in the near future will be “how can a profit 
participant prevent the underreporting problem that Internet 
distribution poses?”94 
B. How Can Profit Participants Prevent Underreporting? 
1. The Independent Audit 
As a matter of course, studio profit participation statements are 
audited by profit participants with clout in the film industry, 
because “participants generally don’t trust the good graces of the 
 
three percent net profit participation after the film had grossed over $660 million 
worldwide to become one of the best selling films of all time. See Kim Masters, 
Hollywood Is As Hollywood Does:’Gump’ Author Nets Success, Not Big Bucks, 
WASH. POST, May 27, 1995, at C1.  The studio later placated the author by paying 
him one million dollars for the film rights to his next book. See Paul F. Young et 
al., Par Buys ‘Gump’ Book Sequel, VARIETY, June 19–25, 1991, at 19. 
• In 1995, the heirs of Jim Garrison, the late New Orleans district attorney who 
wrote On the Trail of the Assassins, upon which the Oliver Stone film JFK 
(Warner Bros. 1991) was based, sued Warner after the film earned over $150 
million in gross receipts, but failed to show a net profit. Garrison v. Warner Bros., 
Inc., 1996 WL 407849 (9th Cir. 1996).  A detailed synopsis of the case and 
pleadings can be found at Garrison v. Warner Brothers, at 
http://www.courttv.com/legaldocs/business/ garrison.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2003). 
• In 1982, Art Buchwald, an internationally renowned writer and humorist, sued 
Paramount Pictures, including then head of motion picture production, Jeffrey 
Katzenberg, for stealing his three-page screen treatment entitled It’s a Crude, 
Crude World and turning it into COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1988).  
At the time, Katzenberg had a high regard for the concept as a movie, describing 
it as “a succinct, smart, straightforward idea with a lot of potential to it” which he 
apparently had no compunction stealing. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1990). 
93 DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 212–13. 
94 Moore, supra note 76. 
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distributor to ensure that their interests are being looked after.”95  
Similar practices are rampant in the recording industry, where 
many labels are owned by the same principal entities.96  Though 
audits are often the only realistic remedy for curing suspected 
reporting errors, they are often ineffective because standard 
contracts allow the studios to approve of the auditor.97  This 
permits the studios to choose an auditor favorable to their interests, 
and release only limited records of the film company, as opposed 
 
95 DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 271. 
96 See Tamara Conniff, Artists Sing Protest Songs: Labels Upbraided at State Hearing 
on Accounting, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 25, 2002, at 1, 31.  This article is indicative of 
the widespread dissatisfaction of artists with accounting practices.  It  begins by stating 
that “audits are a luxury only top-selling artists can afford, leaving many midlevel acts 
without any means of being properly compensated.” Id. at 31.  Noteworthy quotations 
include: (1) Don Henley, recording artist and founder of the Recording Artists Coalition, 
vilifies the accounting practices of the five major record labels stating “[t]here is no 
penalty for negligence and underreporting”; (2) Simon Renshaw, manager for the Dixie 
Chicks, stating after a $20 million settlement that for every client he has represented with 
respect to royalty payments in the last twenty years, the accounting has “always been 
wrong, without exception”; (3) country recording artist Clint Black stating “I’m not an 
accountant, [but I made] $150 million for the record company [and] I could not find 
anyone in my organization to explain to me how [it] could be possible [that I owed them 
money]”; (4) Kathryn Crosby, widow of Bing Crosby, stating “I can tell the difference 
between 7% and 15%” resulting from millions of dollars in underpayments of royalties 
dating from the 1940s; (5) Jennifer Warnes, Oscar and Grammy winning artist stating 
that the royalty statements are “impossible to understand” and that the labels were 
“dishonest and inaccurate”; and (6) Ruben Blades, actor and recording artist, stating that 
the accounting procedures were a “bilingual rip-off.” Id.  Interestingly, the response from 
the labels was to try to minimize the gravity of the harm by (a) stating that settlements 
accounted for only 4% of royalties earned (Paul Robinson, Senior Vice President, Warner 
Music Group); (b) stating that artists earning 17% on revenue make more than labels 
earning 9% on revenue (Linda McLaughlin, industry-hired economist); (c) accusing 
artists of separatism and myopia—”fiddling while Rome burns” and stating that “[t]his 
royalty reporting debate, however well-intentioned it may be, is distracting all of us from 
the very pressing need to band together on . . . piracy, which is taking a huge toll on the 
record business” (Paul Robinson); and (d) attacking the artists’ integrity, calling artists 
“offensive and malicious to malign an entire industry based on stereotypes, innuendo and 
myths” (Cary Sherman, President, Recording Industry Association of America [RIAA]). 
Id.  This author finds the industry’s arguments to be transparently inaccurate and self-
serving because (a) 4% of royalties earned is no small amount when it totals in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars; (b) incredibly few artists make more than labels, and, 
even so, the artists deserve the money because it is their work and most have short 
careers; (c) solidarity with respect to piracy has nothing to do with underreporting, and, 
following the Rome analogy, if the artist is Caesar, “et tu Brute?”; (d) repeated specific 
instances of underreporting are not stereotype, innuendo, or myth; they are reality. 
97 See MOORE, supra note 16, at 139. 
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to their general ledgers or underlying contracts that would show 
unreported income or rebates.98  Furthermore, an audit does not 
give the profit participant the right to inspect the books of 
affiliates, who may be sheltering income.99  Therefore, there is no 
meaningful ability to cross-check amounts posted as income, 
because the affiliates are not parties to the contract between the 
studio and the profit participant.  Additionally, auditors are 
generally not given the right to copy documents (inhibiting full 
review), Talent does not receive back interest on monies owed, and 
Talent must pay for the audit, even in cases of gross under-
compensation.100  Therefore, even though audits are common 
practice, they are not an effective means of ensuring accurate profit 
participation because they are based on insufficient information, 
studios do not have to disgorge the interest on monies improperly 
retained, and Talent bears the risk of paying for most audits 
whether or not they are successful. 
2. Litigation 
Litigation is costly but quite effective, because the threat of 
exposure through discovery often forces a studio to settle rather 
than divulge confidential books that would reveal further abuses.101  
If Talent possesses both the wherewithal and sufficient power to 
prevent litigation from becoming career quicksand, this is probably 
the most effective means for obtaining relief. 
3. Guilds & Arbitration 
Guilds are some of the most powerful forces in Hollywood.  
One way that Talent could help ensure accurate reporting is to 
have auditors appointed by the guilds, not the studios, or at least be 
appointed in equal proportions.  Another provision Talent could 
include is to have any profit participation dispute subject to 
binding arbitration by their respective guild representatives.  While 
such an appointment would clearly help protect Talent’s rights, it 
 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See Littleton, supra note 80. 
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may prove too cumbersome, because, again, the provisions are 
bargained for, and thus not mandatory and subject to guild 
agreements.  In addition, Talent may elect “audit and arbitration,” 
thereby over-taxing guild resources and creating further animosity 
between guilds and studios which have led to tremendous work 
stoppages102 and runaway production.103 
4. Legislation 
Talent may follow the lead of recording artists and push for 
legislation that would establish statutory penalties for, or 
criminalize, improper accounting practices.104 
5. Establish a Fiduciary Duty 
Talent may also wish to introduce legislation under state 
business and professional codes to establish that breaching an 
obligation to pay royalties breaches a fiduciary relationship.105 
 
102 The WGA went on a twenty-two-week strike in 1998 leading to losses estimated in 
the hundreds of millions of dollars and only questionable gains. See Dave McNary, Will 
Biz Replay ‘88 Labor Bloodbath?, VARIETY, May 22–28, 2000, at 7.  Thereafter, the 
threatened writers strike of 2001 gave writers enough leverage to secure a three-year 
contract, providing a $41 million gain when studios sought to prevent an estimated $6.9 
billion dollar loss to the city of Los Angeles.  Michael Mahern, a negotiator for the 
WGA, described this gain as the “best economic package that the Writers Guild has 
achieved since 1977.” See Hollywood Writers Clinch Deal with Producers, CNN, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/SHOWBIZ/TV/05/04/writers.guild.02 (May 4, 2001). 
103 Runaway production (films shot outside Los Angeles) became one of the biggest 
problems for guilds during the 1990s, as producers seeking to lower their film budgets by 
avoiding onerous guild payments shot more and more films in Canada, Australia, and 
elsewhere.  Numerous articles belabor the labor and civic losses that result when films 
are shot outside of Los Angeles. See James Bates, Marketing the State’s Virtues to 
Filmmakers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at C1; Meg James, Valenti Says He’s Against 
Tariffs; Entertainment: Film Industry’s Chief Lobbyist Tells Canadians He Supports Tax 
Credits to Keep Production in U.S., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at C4; Leaving Los 
Angeles: Expo Highlights New Horizons: City Film Commissioners Unhappy with 
‘Runaway Production’, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/SHOWBIZ/Movies/02/29/ 
locations/index.html (Feb. 29, 2000). 
104 See Conniff, supra note 96 (in which California Senators Kevin Murray, D-Culver 
City, and Martha Escutia, D-Norwalk, announced that they may introduce such 
legislation to help settle the “long simmering issue” of recording industry accounting 
practices which has led to “a lot of angry [artists] out there”). 
105 See id. 
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6. Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law focuses less on the agreements themselves than 
on how the agreements are by-products of unequal bargaining 
power between studios and Talent.  In the context of in-house 
Internet video distribution, the recent prevalence of entertainment 
media mega-mergers threatens to abolish Talent profit 
participation entirely because studios will most likely distribute 
through closely held affiliates, thereby secreting profits into 
companies with which Talent has no privity and therefore cannot 
reach.  This argument is more fully developed in Part III. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY: WHO BENEFITS AND SHOULD THEY? 
A. Are Studios Unfairly Arrogating Profits? 
As stated previously, profit participations are creatures of 
contract, and every contract implies an obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing.  Although studios will argue that contractual profit 
participation provisions are entered into freely and knowingly by 
willing parties represented by experienced lawyers, the truth is that 
the definitions cannot be, and are not in fact, negotiated.106  It is, 
therefore, even more critical that when a studio contracts with 
Talent for profit participation, part of their contractual obligation is 
to uphold their duty to report profits accurately and honestly so 
that Talent will receive the benefit of their bargain.  Traditionally, 
however, this has not been the case. 
1. Unequal Bargaining Power and the “Monkey Point” 
Problem 
Historically, the introduction of new technologies to the film 
industry has operated to artists’ detriment.107  In 1960, the WGA 
went on strike, insisting on artist royalties for films released on 
 
106 See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 211. 
107 See Jeffrey K. Joyner, Future Technology Clauses: Would Their Lack of 
Compensation Have Discouraged Shakespeare’s Creativity and Denied Society’s Access 
to His Works in New Media?, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
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television, and received non-retroactive compensation.108  In 1973, 
the WGA again confronted the issue of profit participation with the 
advent of home video.109  At that time, the WGA successfully 
defined and set a participation standard for writers.110 
Currently, new technologies are covered in “future media” 
clauses, usually drafted as all media “now known or hereinafter 
created.”111  The fundamental purpose of this clause is to have 
Talent assign away their rights to profits from those media.112  The 
fact that such a clause even exists in a Talent contract underscores 
the plain fact that “there is unequal bargaining power between the 
two sides [artists and studios] and the [artist] doesn’t feel as if he 
or she can say no because their career is at risk if they do.”113 
Furthermore, in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the 
court noted that if Talent who lack “the ‘clout’ of major stars 
[wish] to work in the film industry [they] must do so on terms 
substantially dictated by the studio.”114  Since it is commonly 
understood that 95% of all actors are non-working actors, it is self-
evident that most of the industry’s Talent occupy weak bargaining 
positions.115  Clearly, the implications are that since most Talent 
are relegated to weak bargaining positions, their profit 
participations will be minimal, and the realization of such profits is 
 
108 See Dave McNary, Showbiz Faces Labor Pains, VARIETY, Mar. 27–Apr. 2, 2000, at 
1. 
109 In 1971, Sony invented the U-Matic video cassette recorder [VCR], beginning a 
revolution in the secondary market for film distribution. See The Betamax Versus VHS 
Battle, Jones Telecommunications and Multimedia Encyclopedia, at http://www. 
digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/sony.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003). 
110 See 2001 Negotiations, Negotiations Alert, History: A Look Back: Progress and 
Sacrifice, WGA West, at http://wga.org/negotiations/alert0700.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2003). 
111 See Alex Alben, Future Technology Clauses and Future Technologies Legal 
Roadblocks to New Media Uses Along the Information Super Highway, ENT. L. REP., 
Mary 1994, at 3, 11. 
112 See id. 
113 Dave McNary & Paul F. Duke, Rewriting the Rules: Writers Guild Fights Studios 
over Draft Notices, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 28, 2000, at 12. 
114 Michael Rudell, The ‘Buchwald’ Case–Phase 2, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1991, at 3 (citing 
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Cal. App. Dep’t 
Super. Ct. 1990)). 
115 Cf. McNary, supra note 113, at 12 (stating that there is unequal bargaining power 
between writers and studios). 
8 - GATIEN FORMAT 5/12/03  8:52 AM 
2003] INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION AND PROFITS 935 
considered illusory: what Eddie Murphy colloquially referred to as 
“Monkey Points.”116  “Monkey Points” is an appropriate term, 
because regardless of the apparent profitability of any particular 
film, the studio invariably claims that the film was not 
profitable.117  The “Monkey Point” problem is exacerbated by 
vertical integration, a problem presented by both the direct and 
inter-company in-house distribution models, which further exclude 
the artist from gaining access to independent reporting sources. 
B. Antitrust Implications? 
1. Vertical Integration Prohibited 
There were many important things happening in 1948.  In the 
film world, it was a “revisionist” period that reexamined and 
reevaluated the Great American Dream.  Jack Warner churned out 
“gritty” realist social dramas at Warner Studios,118 catapulting 
character actors like Humphrey Bogart119 and Bette Davis120 into 
that rarefied realm of stardom previously reserved for matinee 
idols such as Clark Gable121 and Claudette Colbert.122  In the realm 
of politics, the nation was rebuilding.  America had just emerged 
 
116 DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 225. 
117 See Masters, supra note 92 (Paramount claimed no profits after FORREST GUMP 
(Paramount Pictures 1994) grossed over $660 million worldwide). 
118 Jack Warner helped found Warner Brothers in 1923 with his brothers Harry, Albert, 
and Sam.  He was the head of Burbank Studios during its most popular era in the ‘30s 
and ‘40s and sold his remaining interest in the studio in 1967 to a commercial syndicate. 
See A Warner Brothers Retrospective, at http://www.meredy.com/warnerbros (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2003). 
119 Humphrey Bogart starred in TREASURE OF THE SIERRA MADRE (Warner Bros. 1948) 
and KEY LARGO (Warner Bros. 1948). 
120 Bette Davis starred in ALL ABOUT EVE (Twentieth Century Fox 1950), ANOTHER 
MAN’S POISON (Image Entertainment 1952), and PHONE CALL FROM A STRANGER 
(Twentieth Century Fox 1952) in the post-war years. 
121 Clark Gable starred in IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT (Columbia Pictures 1934), MUTINY 
ON THE BOUNTY (MGM 1935), IDIOT’S DELIGHT (MGM 1939), and GONE WITH THE WIND 
(Selznick International Pictures 1939) during the pre-war years. 
122 Claudette Colbert co-starred in IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT (Columbia Pictures 1934) 
with Clark Gable (which won an Oscar for best picture).  She also starred in CLEOPATRA 
(Paramount 1934), THE GILDED LILY (Paramount 1935), SHE MARRIED HER BOSS 
(Columbia 1935), THE FASHION SIDE OF HOLLYWOOD (Paramount 1935), and IT’S A 
WONDERFUL WORLD (MGM 1939) during the pre-war years. 
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from one of the most devastating human tragedies on record, and 
President Truman was busy restoring confidence to a nation that 
had lost 295,000 lives to war.123  The exceptional productivity of 
this time helped screen out the images of desolation left by the war 
and gave Americans a forward looking optimism, which would 
lead to the carefree idealism of the 1950s. 
It was a period when the strong became stronger, yet a sense of 
dignity and responsibility prevailed, set by Truman’s own moral 
imprimatur as a former county judge.124  Equity was a central 
concern of the Democratic Congress125 and the courts, and the 
single most significant manner in which equity was applied to the 
commercial world was through the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 
1890.126 
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act is a federal law prohibiting 
“[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
[interstate or foreign] trade . . . .”127  Its primary targets are 
unlawful monopolies that impose unreasonable restraints on 
trade,128 punishing unlawful monopolistic behavior with 
imprisonment for up to three years, individual fines up to $350,000 
per violation, and corporate fines up to $10 million per violation.129 
The leading case of the post-war era to use the Sherman Act to 
prevent unlawful monopolistic behavior in the entertainment 
 
123 See World War II Fatalities, at http://www.stokesey.demon.co.uk/wwii/casualty.html 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2003). 
124 See FAQ: How Could Truman Be a “Judge” if He Did Not Graduate from Law 
School?, Truman Presidential Museum and Library, at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ 
trivia/judge.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003). 
125 Part of Truman’s winning platform consisted of reducing the cost of government, 
instituting stand-by wage price controls, promoting federal laws to end job 
discrimination, decreasing taxes for low-income people, raising the minimum wage from 
forty to seventy-five cents per hour, using federal funds to provide low-cost housing and 
permanent price supports for farmers, and creating a national health program. See 
Comparing the 1948 Platforms, Truman Presidential Museum and Library, at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/1948campaign/large/docs/ 
student_activities/sta12-1.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003). 
126 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000). 
127 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
128 See generally BUTLER SHAFFER, IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE: THE BUSINESS CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST COMPETITION, 1918–1938 (1997) (analyzing the issue of unfair competition). 
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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industry was United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.130  In 
Paramount, the Supreme Court held the vertical integration of 
production, distribution, and exhibition achieved by the five major 
film studios to be an unlawful restraint on trade.131  The facts of the 
case reveal that the studios had exerted their considerable leverage 
in a concerted scheme of price fixing coupled with unreasonable 
clearances to prevent competition by independent exhibitors.132 
2. The Return to Vertical Integration 
Since that landmark case was handed down, however, the 
pendulum has swung in the opposite direction and, despite Judge 
Richard Posner’s contention that “antitrust doctrine is supple 
enough, and its commitment to economic rationality strong 
enough, to take in stride the competitive issues presented by the 
new economy,”133 courts have consistently ruled against finding 
antitrust violations.134  This is true despite the fact that the Truman 
administration would likely be shocked by the conglomerations of 
vast amounts of power in the hands of very few modern media 
giants today. 
The purblind acquiescence of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial bodies is unprecedented, and their fealty to the 
corporations that assure their future livelihood cannot be 
understated.  Within the last ten years, Congress, the courts, and 
administrative agencies have relaxed most restrictions on national 
media ownership.135 
The signs of re-integration were initially faint, but clear.  In the 
1990s, the legislature began to remove the restraints on vertically 
integrated production, distribution and exhibition, effectively 
 
130 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 145–47. 
133 Richard A. Posner, Address: Antitrust in the New Economy, Tech Law Journal, at 
http://www.techlawjournal.com/atr/20000914posner.asp (Sept. 14, 2000). 
134 See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets?: 
An Inquiry into Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Broadband Regulation As Applied to 
“The New Economy”, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 41, 61 (2001). 
135 See Jerome A. Barron, Globalism and National Media Policies in the United States 
and Canada: A Critique of C. Edwin Baker’s Media, Markets, and Democracy, 27 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 971, 980 (2002). 
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overturning Paramount.136  In 1995, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) eliminated the Financial Interest and 
Syndication (hereinafter “Fin-Syn”) Rules.137  The Fin-Syn Rules 
were designed to prevent major networks from distributing and 
profit sharing in domestic syndication, and to restrict their 
activities in foreign markets to distributing programs that they 
exclusively produced.138  Critics have charged that “independent 
and creative programming [have] been stamped out by the repeal 
of fin-syn.”139  Over the next several years to the present, the FCC 
eliminated most of the Chain Broadcasting Rules, which limited 
the duration of affiliate agreements and the number of TV stations 
a network could own, citing the high degree of competition 
introduced by satellite, cable and videocassette.140 
Then, in September 1999, the FCC eliminated the duopoly 
rules in favor of a “waiver” system for the top television 
markets.141  Previously, the duopoly rules prevented television 
broadcasters from owning two of the top four stations in a single 
market.142  Following this decision, however, media owners could 
petition to own more than one station absent a showing of 
prejudice against the minority owners.143 
Finally, in February 2002, the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia struck down and remanded for reconsideration the 
FCC rules limiting media ownership of television stations to thirty-
five percent of the national television audience, holding that such a 
limit was “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.”144  The 
 
136 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
137 See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 681 
(5th ed. 1999). 
138 See id. at 668. 
139 Pamela McClintock, FCC Is Owning Up: Media Regs Are Outdated, Studies Find, 
DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 2, 2002, at 14. 
140 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 137, at 666–67, 686–89.  This rationale would, by 
extension, apply to the Internet. 
141 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1999). 
142 See FCC Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television 
Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations and Review of Policy and Rules, 47 C.F.R. pt. 
73. 
143 See id.; CARTER ET AL., supra note 137, at 612. 
144 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed Communications Comm’n, 280 F.3d 1027, 1033 
(D.C. Cir. 2002), amended by 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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court set no guidelines for determining what limit would not be 
“arbitrary and capricious.”145  However, given both the legislative 
and judicial permissiveness evident in the decision not to challenge 
the purchase of Chris-Craft by Fox, which resulted in Fox owning 
forty-one percent of the national television audience prior to this 
decision, it can be inferred that a forty-one percent limit was 
tolerable.146  In that same decision, the court also vacated the 
cable-broadcast cross-ownership rule,147 under which a single 
company could not own a cable television system and a TV station 
in the same city, because the court found it “unlikely the [FCC 
would] be able on remand to justify retaining it.”148 
Presently, FCC Chairman Michael Powell is reviewing all of 
the FCC regulations with respect to ownership, and he is leaning 
toward deregulation and merger.  On October 1, 2002, the FCC 
released twelve studies suggesting the abandonment of (1) the 
national cap of thirty-five percent on broadcast media ownership 
designed to ensure that local audiences receive local programming; 
(2) the duopoly rule, because the number of media outlets has 
increased by an average of 195 percent since 1960 while the 
number of independent owners has increased by 139 percent; and 
(3) the cross-ownership rules, despite a survey of the 2000 
presidential election which showed that in ten markets where 
waivers had been granted, half of the co-owned companies 
reported the news with similar bias.149 
Following this report, FCC Chairman Powell has fast-tracked 
the review of the ownership rules, granting only a thirty-day 
extension for public commentary on the studies150 and indicating 
 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 1036; Jayson Blair, Two Stations, One Tabloid, One Owner, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 2001, at B1 (noting the FCC’s approval of Fox’s acquisition of Chris-Craft for 
$4.4 billion).  This deal allowed Fox to temporarily become the nation’s largest media 
owner.  At that time, Fox owned two stations in Los Angeles, two in New York, and two 
in Phoenix, and had an aggregate total of forty-one percent of the national television 
market despite the thirty-five percent FCC ownership limitation. See id. 
147 See 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (2000). 
148 Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1033. 
149 See McClintock, supra note 139, at 14. 
150 See Pamela McClintock, FCC Extending Deadline for Public Say on Studies, DAILY 
VARIETY, Nov. 6, 2002, at 8. 
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that there is no need for public hearings.151  Critics of Powell’s 
approach have called the studies skewed,152 revealing a “deeply 
flawed perspective that while ratifying the chairman’s view fails to 
adequately assess the realities of the news and entertainment media 
marketplace.”153  Powell has consistently defended his position, 
stating that the “FCC is committed to achieving its longstanding 
goals of diversity, competition and localism in the media and has 
taken significant steps to ensure that the public has a full and fair 
opportunity to participate.”154  However, Mona Mangan, Executive 
Director of the 12,000 member WGA, has expressed concern with 
Powell’s genuineness, stating that “[r]adio and television are not 
just profit centers for large corporations but are precious national 
assets.  Our job is to preserve and protect them in the interest of 
democracy.”155  With the recent replacement of Senator Fritz 
Hollings, D-South Carolina, by Republican Senator John McCain, 
R-Arizona, to the chair of the Senate Commerce Committee, it is 
almost certain that the ownership rules will be relaxed or 
abandoned, as evidenced by his comments that the rules are 
“anachronistic” and “unnecessary.”156  The result of all of these 
decisions has been the unsurprising but inevitable return to vertical 
integration.157 
3. The Studios’ Justification 
The film studios have justified this return to vertical integration 
by citing the increase in the post-theatrical film market (i.e., video, 
DVD, video-on-demand, near-video-on-demand, pay-per-view, 
 
151 See Dave McNary, FCC Commish Backs WGA, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 25, 2002, at 8. 
152 See McClintock, supra note 150, at 31. 
153 McClintock, supra note 139, at 1 (quoting Jeffrey Chester of the Center for Digital 
Democracy). 
154 McClintock, supra note 150, at 31. 
155 McNary, supra note 151, at 8. 
156 See Brooks Boliek, Regs Rewrite on Fast Track: Senate Power Shift Makes 
Ownership Rules Top Priority, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 7, 2002, at 1. 
157 One interesting casualty of the deregulation war was Department of Justice antitrust 
chief Charles James, who negotiated Microsoft’s controversial antitrust settlement.  
James was accused of coming in with a strong case and writing a “softball settlement” 
filled with loopholes that gave no effect to curbing Microsoft’s anti-competitive behavior.  
Eerily, James later stepped down to become general counsel of ChevronTexaco. See Paul 
Davidson, Antitrust Chief to Leave Justice Post, USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 2002, at 2B. 
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pay TV, free TV, and the syndication market).  At first blush, this 
reasoning may appear sound.  As far back as 1980, worldwide 
revenues for video constituted only thirty percent of the projected 
theatrical revenues.158  Currently, however, video revenues have 
surpassed theatrical revenues for most films,159 and that is where 
studios reap the majority of their profits, because their margins are 
much higher than for a typical theatrical release.160 
The studios’ reasoning finds support in the Chicago school 
analysis of vertical integration.  This position holds that vertical 
integration should be per se legal161 because vertical integration is 
either competitively neutral or pro-competitive.162  This kind of 
thinking predominated the Reagan era, and under both the Reagan 
and Bush Antitrust Divisions, the Department of Justice only 
prevented a single vertical merger.163  Ironically, this was the 
proposed merger between Showtime and The Movie Channel with 
a number of film distributors.164 
Additionally, one might argue that because the studios own 
their films they have a right to exploit them as they see fit.  This 
argument finds support under the traditional market ethos that 
there is an “Invisible Hand” which regulates market pricing and 
availability.165 
 
158 Michael Blaha, Lecture at Southwestern University School of Law (Spring 2002) 
(Mr. Blaha is an entertainment attorney and former Vice President of Legal Affairs at 
Columbia Pictures). 
159 See Tulchin, supra note 48 (stating that in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s worldwide 
video revenue surpassed revenue from theatrical distribution and other media). 
160 Typically, a theatrical distribution fee is 40%, whereas it effectively varies between 
75–92% for home video based on either the “rental” (18–25%), “revenue share” (12–
18%), or “sell-through” (8–12%) models. See MOORE, supra note 16, at 134–35, 140. 
161 See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8 (1981). 
162 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
225–31 (1978). 
163 See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-
Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 514 (1995). 
164 For a detailed discussion of the proposed merger and related antitrust issues, see 
Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Video Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the Movie 
Channel As a Case Study, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS AND 
TECHNOLOGY 338 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1985). 
165 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1981) (1776) (studying 
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4. Is the Studios’ Reasoning Specious? 
However, this “gross abdication of responsibility”166 over the 
last nineteen years has led to the realization that there are clearly 
“situations where vertical mergers and other vertical restraints can 
raise significant competitive concerns.”167  This new school of 
thought is known as the Post-Chicago School, and although it does 
not suggest a return to a per se prohibition of vertical mergers, it 
suggests that such mergers be evaluated and enforced on a case-by-
case basis to determine if they will have an unreasonable anti-
competitive effect.168  Essentially, its critique of the Chicago 
School is based on the “[observation] that Chicago style theories of 
competitive robustness were based on overly simplistic market 
assumptions, including fixed proportions, good information, and 
relatively easy entry.”169  However, the truth remains that 
“anticompetitive strategic behavior becomes much more plausible 
when these assumptions are relaxed.”170 
 
seriously for the first time the nature of capital and the historical development of industry 
and commerce). 
166 Riordan & Salop, supra note 163, at 514 (quoting Letter from Jack Brooks, 
Chairperson of the House Judiciary Committee, to DOJ Assistant Attorney General Anne 
Bingaman and FTC Chairperson Janet Steiger (Nov. 4, 1993)). 
167 Id. at 515. 
168 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 283–89, 329–49 (1994) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY]; Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge 
Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 
Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 205 (1990); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming from? Where Are We 
Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A 
Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257 (2001) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, 
Post-Chicago Antitrust]; Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through 
Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE 
L.J. 209, 230 (1986); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, The Logic of Vertical Restraints, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. 921 (1986); Riordan & Salop, supra note 163; Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a 
Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1995); White, supra note 
164. 
169 See Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust, supra note 168. 
170 Id. 
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of 
Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing antitrust law.171  
However, because of their overlapping authority, the two 
departments often clash over who will handle particular 
mergers.172  This process is not subject to public scrutiny and slows 
down by several days the time in which mergers are approved.173  
Consequently, the FTC ceded oversight of media and 
entertainment industry mergers to the DOJ in an effort to speed up 
the clearance process.174  Thereafter, entertainment industry 
mergers ran virtually unchecked, totaling an unprecedented 362 
mergers and acquisitions worth $49.4 billion in the year 2000.175  
Senator Fritz Hollings, then chairperson of the Senate 
Appropriations subcommittee and chair of the Senate Commerce 
Committee, called the FTC’s practice “illegal” and threatened FTC 
Chairperson Tim Muris with slashing the FTC’s budget and 
worker salaries in order to “get their full attention.”176  The 
Republican-led FCC had even gone so far as to file a formal 
appeal, demanding that the recent deregulation of media 
conglomerates be reversed,177 but with the recent appointment of 
Senator McCain and the Republican takeover of the Senate, the 
 
171 See Brooks Boliek, FTC Faces Holling’s Wrath over DOJ’s Merger Control, 
HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 20, 2002, at 1, 36. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See Year 2000 Media Industry M&A, CLIENT BRIEFING (The Jordan, Edmiston 
Group, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Jan./Feb. 2001, http://www.jegi.com/pdf/Jan-Feb% 
202001.pdf. 
176 Boliek, supra note 171, at 1.  Muris defended the deal, claiming that the clearance 
process had become too “confrontational and fractious” and that this would allow 
antitrust officials to do their job more efficiently.  His reasoning is both specious and 
suspect.  It is specious because the delay is only a few days in a process that can take 
several months, and it is suspect because the decision was partially based upon advice 
from an outside consultant, Joe Sims, who represents AOL-Time Warner.  Hollings noted 
the conflict of interest to which Sims responded, “I don’t buy that argument.  It obviously 
makes no difference to me in my practice if it’s the FTC or DOJ.  I get paid whichever 
way it goes.” Id. at 36.  Hollings, obviously flustered, stated “[t]his administration is 
running amok.” Id. 
177 See Pamela McClintock, FCC Appeals Media Ruling, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 22, 
2002, at 1, 17. 
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threat of a budget slash by the Senate Appropriations Committee 
was neutralized.178 
Senator Holling’s argument is persuasive, since although more 
voices can be heard, those voices are owned by fewer corporations.  
In a chilling parallel to the conditions which gave rise to the 1948 
divestiture of film studios from exhibition,179 media ownership has 
currently been reduced to essentially seven major corporations—
only this time they have even more reach.180 
For example, in 1995, the American Broadcast Company 
merged with the Walt Disney Corporation in a $19 billion dollar 
deal to become ABC-Disney.181  In December 2000, Vivendi-
Seagram-Canal+ became Vivendi-Universal in a merger valued at 
$34 billion.182  Then, in 2001, AOL-Time Warner followed suit, 
becoming the largest media giant in a merger valued at $106 
billion.183 
 
178 See Brooks Boliek, Regs Rewrite on Fast Track: Senate Power Shift Makes 
Ownership Rules Top Priority, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 7, 2002, at 1. 
179 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
180 See supra note 13. 
181 This $19 billion merger was completed in August 1995, and by the end of the week 
their combined value reached $48 billion. See Nancy Gibbs, Easy As ABC: In One 
Megadeal, Eisner Turns His Magic Kingdom into a Global Empire and Takes His Sweet 
Revenge on a Choir of Critics, TIME, Aug. 14, 1995, at 24. 
182 This $34 billion merger was created in December 2000 based on an agreement 
announced June 20, 2000.  It incorporated Universal Pictures and Universal Music 
Group, then owned by Seagram, and gave the media giant control over 9,000 films, 
27,000 television episodes, and 750,000 songs.  It includes a forty-two percent equity 
stake in USA Networks, which includes the Sci-Fi Channel, the Home Shopping 
Network, TicketMaster, the Hotel Reservations Network, Gramercy Pictures, and 
October Films. See Lori Enos, Vivendi, Seagram and Canal+ to Merge, E-Commerce 
Times, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/3601.html (June 20, 2000).  It also 
includes companies in the areas of film, Internet, music, television, publishing, and 
telecoms including, inter alia, MCA, Polygram, Island/Def Jam, Motown, Geffen, 
Interscope, and Rising Tide records; United International and Cinema International BV 
pictures; VivendiNet, Vizzavi, and Universal Studios New Media Group Internet 
services; Multimedia and Brillstein-Grey television entertainment; Havas Press 
publishing; and Cegetel and Vivendi telecom for telecom services. See Frontline: The 
Merchants of Cool: Media Giants: Vivendi Universal, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/cool/giants/vivendi.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003). 
183 This $106 billion merger was completed January 11, 2001, giving the combined 
media and Internet giant a $205 billion market capitalization. See Patrick Ross & Evan 
Hansen, AOL, Time Warner Complete Merger with FCC Blessing, CNet News, at 
http://www.news.com.com/2100-1023-250781.html?legacy=cnet (Jan. 11, 2001). 
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These media giants have major holdings in the six principal 
media areas: theatrical film, television, cable, telecom, music, and 
video.  Without even so much as a national media restriction, these 
few companies now control both the news and entertainment 
media—under the tacit approval of the executive, legislative and 
judicial bodies—in order to influence our perceptions of world 
events and the content through which we enjoy our free time. 
The net effect of these mergers is that the “little guys” are 
being drowned out by the “noise” of too many voices; or 
insignificant because they will not have the advertising budget 
with which to capture the attention of the billion or so netizens 
projected to be using the world wide web by 2006.184 
For independent film producers, this will likely mean that there 
is no real point of entry, and Internet distribution is not likely to 
cure this problem.  Independent producers will not be able to rent 
their films effectively over the Internet unless they do so through 
large film companies that have the power to collect revenues, the 
visibility to attract consumers, and the wealth to maintain reliable 
servers from which consumers can download the videos. 
The studios’ reasoning is therefore specious, because the net 
result of these mergers is an unprecedented anti-competitive effect.  
There will be decreased competition because, in effect, the studios 
will once again control all video distribution worldwide, and the 
independent producer/distributor’s share will be next to nothing. 
The most dramatic testament to the effectiveness of the studios 
to eliminate competition with respect to Internet distribution thus 
far has been the low-profile failure of Intertainer, the first attempt 
at establishing an online video rental outlet.185  Intertainer, which 
was launched in 2001, and forced to license its premier films from 
the film studios, failed after less than a year, garnering only 
147,000 customers and spending nearly all of its $125 million in 
venture capital.186  Although Intertainer clearly had problems 
licensing quality films, and although some critics charge that its 
failure was also due to imperfect streaming and a $7.95 per month 
 
184 See Internet User Forecast by Country, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
185 See Fritz, supra note 74. 
186 See id. 
8 - GATIEN FORMAT 5/12/03  8:52 AM 
946 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:909 
subscription fee, it is worth noting that Intertainer is currently 
suing the studios for anti-competitive behavior.187  Moreover, the 
agreement between the five studios comprising Movielink to 
establish fixed rental prices188 may very well lead to a lawsuit 
similar to one recently filed by the states against the recording 
industry, which resulted in a $143 million settlement.189 
IV. HOW PIRACY MAY AFFECT PROFIT PARTICIPANTS 
Traditionally, studios have exploited both domestic (including 
both the U.S. and Canada) and foreign home video markets by 
physically shipping videos to content aggregators.  This method 
was inordinately expensive.  It costs approximately three dollars to 
make each video cassette,190 excluding the cost of shipping 
(airfreight or ground), allowances for damage and piracy, and the 
vast infrastructure required to support such a labor intensive model 
(including, but not limited to, unions, product tracking, and 
independent auditing of sales agents).  The U.S. film industry earns 
$7.5 billion annually from worldwide distribution.191  Video 
distribution accounts for approximately forty percent of this total, 
or $3 billion.192  However, these gross revenues are often offset by 
losses to video piracy. 
 
187 See Slate Sidebar, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2073743&sidebar=2073744 (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2003) (stating that the lawsuit may be “little more than a last-ditch effort to 
recoup some cash for investors who bought into a failed Internet business”). 
188 See Risky Business? New On-Demand Digital Movies May Not Be Pirate Proof, 
supra note 75 (in which the five studios comprising Movielink announce that they have 
settled on a rental price of approximately $3.99 per film). 
189 See Tamara Conniff, CD Price-Fixing Suit Settled: Labels, Chains to Compensate 
States to Tune of $143 Mil, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 1–7, 2002, at 1, 91. 
190 This includes the cost of the cassette, billing block stickers, cassette cases, and key 
art.  Key art is generally created for the theatrical advertising campaign, and billed as a 
“theatrical distribution expense.”  Later, this art is often re-used on video cassettes, and 
the cost is charged again, only now it is billed as a “video distribution expense.” See 
DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 65. 
191 See ‘Angels’ Take the Cake in Big-Screen Debut, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2000/SHOWBIZ/Movies/11/05/box.office.ap (Nov. 5, 2000). 
192 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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A. On-Line Piracy: The Sum of All Fears 
The greatest perceived loss from Internet video distribution is 
piracy.193  As reported in Daily Variety, bootleg copies of films on 
video, DVD, and VCD cost Hollywood an aggregate total of $1.2 
billion in lost revenues in 2001194  the equivalent of one-third of 
the entire revenue generated from video distribution worldwide  
Moreover, losses in the United States account for $250 million, or 
one-twelfth, of that total.195 
Under the old model, where videos were physically shipped to 
foreign markets, the threat of piracy was significant, yet limited by 
language,196 incompatible formats,197 and the cost of maintaining a 
piracy ring, which was nearly impossible to do on a global scale.  
The Internet, however, threatens to erase each of these limitations. 
When video is released on the Internet, anyone at anytime will 
be able to download a video if a pirate supplies him or her with a 
decryption code.  Additionally, unencrypted videos could be 
swapped peer-to-peer,198 in effect creating a “Napster for 
Movies”199 that could virtually eliminate the video market for a 
 
193 See McClintock, supra note 3, at A9. 
194 See id. (figures broken down as follows: U.S. ($250 million), Russia ($250 million), 
China ($160 million), Italy ($140 million), Brazil ($120 million), India ($70 million), 
Germany ($70 million), Mexico ($50 million), France ($50 million), and Turkey ($50 
million)). 
195 See id. 
196 Films are either dubbed (a voice over is done by a native speaker in the local 
language and the words are synched, as well as possible, to the actor’s lip movement) or 
subtitled (the text of the actor’s speech is translated into the local language and placed at 
the bottom of the screen for the audience to read as the film plays, but the actor’s words 
remain in the original language of the country producing the film). 
197 Worldwide video standards include U.S.: NTSC (National Television System 
Committee, 525 lines per frame); Europe: PAL (Phase Alternating Line, 625 lines per 
frame); France: SECAM (Sequential Color with Memory, 625 lines per frame). See What 
Is Standards Conversion, 3D Research Video, at http://www.3dresearch.com/video/ 
Conversion2.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003). 
198 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-02669, 2002 
WL 398676, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2002), Classicberry Ltd. v. Musicmaker.Com, Inc., 
No. 01-CV-1756, 2001 WL 1658241, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001), aff’d, No. 02-
CV-7054, 2002 WL 31313186 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2002). 
199 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (the final 
Napster decision); David Iler, Pirate-Proofing On-Demand Content, COMMUNICATIONS 
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film overnight.  Compared with the projected losses from Internet 
video distribution, therefore, the traditional loss figures for piracy 
will be child’s play. 
Certainly, studios will seek to prevent Internet piracy.200  
Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., D-Delaware, chair of the foreign 
relations panel, stated “[n]ot to protect it is equivalent to letting 
coal be stolen from our mines or water taken from our rivers . . . 
[but] how will we preserve the creativity and experimentation that 
are America’s inexhaustible oil wells?”201  Senator Biden touches 
on perhaps the greatest problem facing Internet distribution: the 
perceived notion that a “perfect copy” of a current film released as 
a rental, or an older film released to meet the standards of high-
definition television (HDTV), will completely exhaust the studios’ 
film libraries.202  If past experience with music203 and video204 
piracy is any indication, this is a well-founded fear.  However, 
much to the consternation of film studio executives, recognizing 
the problem does not necessarily lead to a solution. 
Piracy issues can be broken down into two areas: prevention 
and enforcement. 
 
ENGINEERING & DESIGN, Feb. 2, 2002 (expressing the fear of unrestricted video 
swapping), http://www.cedmagazine.com/ced/2002/0202/id4.htm; Reuters, supra note 
66. 
200 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 333, 340 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d 
Cir. 2001); David Iler, supra note 199 (providing an excellent analysis of how studios 
plan to encrypt videos distributed via broadband Internet). 
201 McClintock, supra note 3, at A9. 
202 See id. 
203 See Ray Bennett, Music Hits Worldwide Sour Note, HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 17, 
2002, at 5, 48 (stating that according to figures released by the International Federation of 
the Phonographic Industry, the worldwide record industry fell five percent in 2001 
because of increased piracy). 
204 See Bob Sullivan, Net Pirates Poach Harry Potter Film: Film Copied with DV 
Camera, Posted in Chat Rooms, MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/834107.asp 
(Nov. 13, 2002) (“[O]ne million fans had watched illegal copies of ‘Star Wars: Attack of 
the Clones’ over the Internet before it was released in May [2002], and that about two 
million people in the United States regularly try to download pirated video.”  
Furthermore, the web site vcdquality.com is exclusively dedicated to rating the quality of 
pirated films and gives clear indications as to how to locate such films online.). 
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1. Preventing Piracy 
In order to prevent piracy, the studios have argued for—and 
received—high levels of encryption technology.205  Setting a high-
level encryption standard is a relatively simple issue, since it can 
be achieved by passing legislation through Congress by an 
extremely powerful lobbyist, the film industry.  Even so, setting a 
stringent encryption standard will not make a downloaded video 
theft-proof, because digital pirates often copy films directly off the 
screen with digital cameras.206  Although film studios now tag their 
pre-screening films with near-invisible identifiers to determine 
where the copies were made,207 there have been no resulting 
convictions. 
Additionally, as Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes 
amply illustrates, security systems are vulnerable at the source.208  
In Reimerdes, the DVD Content Scrambling System (DeCSS) 
encryption used to protect copyrighted works on DVD was broken 
by a fifteen-year-old “sleuth” who received an unencrypted DVD 
disc because of a factory slip-up.209  In digital video distribution, it 
is more likely that the encryption code studios use to protect the 
video will be circumvented by an inside job.  In such a scenario, a 
trusted studio agent copies an unencrypted video and delivers it to 
pirates who distribute it to the public.  For example, James Cofer, a 
trusted security vault manager, was convicted of bribing security 
vault guards for access to the unreleased films Armageddon, 
Fantasia 2000, and Mighty Joe Young, in order to duplicate the 
videos and sell them on the Internet.210  The court fined Cofer 
 
205 See McClintock, supra note 3, at A9 (Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion 
Picture Association of America [MPAA], lobbied Capitol Hill, threatening that as long as 
studios did not receive assurances that films would have adequate copyright protection 
technology, studios would refuse to open their libraries for Internet distribution). 
206 See Sullivan, supra note 204 (stating that by using digital video cameras mounted on 
tripods in conjunction with handicapped seating that offers headphones for enhanced 
hearing, pirates are able to create near-perfect digital reproductions from theater screens 
and then post the films to the Internet). 
207 See id. 
208 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
209 See id. 
210 See Legal Briefs, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 20–22, 2000, at 22. 
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$1,450, sentenced him to sixty days on a work crew, and placed 
him on three years’ probation for his trade secret violation.  His co-
defendant, Gerhard, was sentenced to either 120 days in jail or 60 
days on a work crew, and fined $10,900.211 
Clearly, encryption is the first line of defense and the studios’ 
best method for preventing piracy.  On Capitol Hill, the battle 
rages on as opposing parties attempt to strike a balance between 
privatized gain and socialized loss.212  Proponents argue for 
stronger encryption to protect copyrighted works and to ensure a 
maximum return on profits.213  Opponents, however, argue that 
such restrictions violate free speech and the fair use doctrine of the 
Copyright Act, and that the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) amount to copyright 
misuse by conferring a greater monopoly than was intended by 
Congress.214  Others have argued that DMCA’s penalties violate 
the Eighth Amendment.215 
This dispute is fomenting and  bitterly pits the nation’s largest 
computer and software producers against Hollywood studios.  The 
computer companies216 decry government intervention, calling the 
 
211 See id. 
212 See McClintock, supra note 3. 
213 See Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
214 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
215 See Robert Lemos, Protesters Declare War on Copyright Law, CNet News, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-272415.html (Aug. 30, 2001) (Lawrence Lessig, 
director of Stanford University’s Center for Internet and Society, railed against the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA] in what he called “the beginning of a 
revolution” at a legal defense fundraiser in the wake of the arrest and sentencing of 
Alexander Katalov, the president of Elcon, and Dmitry Sklyarov, for trafficking in a 
program designed to circumvent copyright protection for eBooks so that copies could be 
made and freely distributed among Internet users.  Both pled guilty to five criminal 
counts, which could impose a penalty of up to $2.5 million in damages and twenty-five 
years in prison.). 
216 The alliance that has been forged in order to prevent government imposed encryption 
controls includes the RIAA, the Business Software Alliance (comprised, inter alia, of 
Microsoft, Apple, Adobe, Symantec, Autodesk, and Macromedia), the Computer Systems 
Policy Project (comprised of the CEOs from, inter alia, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, 
Intel, and Unisys), as well as various consumer groups. See Brooks Boliek, High-Tech 
Group Targets H’wood: Coalition Seeks to Curtail Copyright Controls on Digital 
Devices, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 24–26, 2003, at 4, 51; Associated Press, Net Music 
Copyright Deal Reached: Recording Industry, Tech Firms Negotiate Compromise, 
MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/859079.asp (Jan. 14, 2003). See also Computer 
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motion picture industry “the enemy” and claiming that encryption 
and “locking controls” placed on personal computers will allow the 
government to “lobotomiz[e] our laptops.”217  Hollywood, on the 
other hand, has become politically isolated because of its 
aggressive support for copyright protection that would “prohibit 
the manufacture and distribution of ‘digital media devices’—such 
as handheld music players—unless they include government-
approved copy restriction technology.”218  Although Congress has 
thus far legislated in favor of stronger and longer copyright 
protection,219 past regulations were instituted under Democratic 
leadership.  Therefore, if the present Republican majority in the 
House and Senate, coupled with Silicon Valley’s seven-figure 
lobbying budget, is any indication, Hollywood will have a tough 
battle ahead.220 
2. Enforcement and Collecting Judgments 
Enforcement and collecting judgments are entirely different 
matters, each requiring expensive lawyers, the power of the U.S. 
court system (which can be slow and unpredictable), and 
cooperation from foreign governments who are often unconcerned 
with, or indifferent to, American companies’ need to secure 
profits.221  One of the greatest problems with enforcement is that 
piracy presents a constantly moving target. 
 
Systems Policy Project, at http://www.cspp.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2003); BSA 
Members, Business Software Association, at http://www.bsa.org/usa/about/members (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2003). 
217 Boliek, supra note 216, at 4, 51 (quoting Fred McClure, President of the Alliance for 
Digital Progress). 
218 Associated Press, supra note 216 (quoting Senator Ernest Hollings). 
219 See Commerce and Foreign Trade, 15 C.F.R. pt. 734, Supp. 1 (2000) (U.S. Export 
Administration Regulations). See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
220 See Boliek, supra note 216, at 4, 51 (describing MPAA President Jack Valenti’s 
challenge to Fred McClure to engage in a public debate with respect to this issue). 
221 See Cathy Dunkley, Windows of Opportunity: Release Patterns Are Collapsing 
Around the World and It’s Making the World Seem Smaller, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 10–
16, 2000, at 18. 
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B. Who Are Targets of Piracy? Industrial Age v. Information Age 
Big Business, Not the Problem 
Traditionally, the bigger the target, the easier it is to prevent 
piracy.  A larger target is easier to locate, easier to prosecute, and 
easier to collect judgments from.  This was true in the Industrial 
Age, when hard copies (videocassettes) were piracy targets.  If a 
pirate could obtain an unprotected video, or circumvent both 
copyright protection and encryption software, then the pirate could 
make and sell tape duplications.  In 2000, the entertainment 
industry claimed a $35 million dollar loss in domestic video 
revenue because of tape piracy, leading to an overall downturn of 
seventy percent in gross proceeds when corrected for inflation.222  
This form of piracy was also particularly popular abroad, leading 
to losses of more than $950 million in 2001.223 
For physical distribution of a tangible product, however, pirates 
require a large operation: they need tape duplication machines, 
they have to purchase tapes, make “knock off” key art versions for 
video sleeves, secure warehouses to store the tapes, and ship the 
pirated tapes to consumers.  All of this requires money, time, and 
facilities. 
Consequently, for physical copies, the economies of scale 
support pirates having larger operations, because the larger they 
are, the more efficient their operation will be.  Therefore, under the 
traditional model, pirates, although harmful, were more easily 
controlled because they were bigger targets and easier to find. 
Enforcement of Internet distribution is also geared to catching 
large-scale operations.  For example, the DMCA has “notice and 
takedown” provisions, which require any entity accused of 
copyright infringement to effectively cease and desist 
 
222 See id. at 18–19 (discussing the burdens and benefits of simultaneous verses 
staggered release patterns and the possible effect on overall net revenue for film studios). 
223 See McClintock, supra note 3; text accompanying note 195. See also Matthew 
Brzezinski, Stopping Russian Theft Is Nyet Easy, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A1; 
Jeremy Hansen, H.K. (Hong Kong) Chops Piracy: Customs Official Reports 98% 
Curtailment, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 4, 2000, at 9; Tessa Jazmines, Philippine Talent Asks 
for Help, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A10; Scott Rosenberg, Thai Retailers Busted 
for Illegal Goods, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A10. 
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operations.224  Furthermore, since entities must register with an 
online service provider, they will be easier to track and less likely 
to be able to maintain a sustained effort.225 
1. What About the Little Guys? 
In the Information Age, however, individuals present the 
greatest threat.  This is probably the single most frightening aspect 
of modern piracy to copyright holders.  With the proper decryption 
devices, anyone, anywhere, anytime can obtain a pirated copy of 
protected material.226 
In  2000, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
began to aggressively pursue individual pirates and hired Ranger 
Online, a Canadian company that patrols the Internet by sending 
out “take down” notices227 to Internet service providers and 
individual users in multiple countries and in multiple languages.228  
For independent films, the American Film Marketing Association 
is the principal enforcement body, and it also employs Ranger 
Online, as well as another search engine.229  In 2001, 
approximately 54,000 warning notices were sent to individuals 
 
224 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2000); ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 
239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
225 See McClintock, supra note 3. 
226 See David Clark, Encryption Advances to Meet Internet Challenges, Computer, at 
http://www.computer.org/computer/articles/August/technews800.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2003) (noting that the time to break encryption ranges from 104 years in millions of 
instructions per second (MIPS) for RSA/DSA key size of 512 to 1038 years for RSA/DSA 
key size of 21,000) (Author’s note: This does not mean it takes 1000 years to break an 
encryption of 512; this time is greatly accelerated by larger computers, such as the Kray 
computer, or by placing slower computers in serial phase so that they can process the 
instructions simultaneously.  In this instance, breaking a 512 encryption would take less 
than one month). 
227 See Ranger Client Testimonials, Ranger Library, at http://www.rangerinc.com/ 
Library/6-1.shtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2003) (“Ranger has developed a custom search 
engine and an automated system for sending out “take down” notices asking Internet 
service providers to notify a particular customer of the violation and these notices can 
also can go directly to Internet users.”). 
228 See McClintock, supra note 3, at A9–A10. 
229 See id. at A10. 
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downloading films from the Internet, a number that is projected to 
double in 2002.230 
Ranger Online (hereinafter “Ranger”) works in the following 
way: (1) studios or independent producers—“indies”—submit a 
list of titles to Ranger; (2) Ranger searches Internet chat rooms and 
sites from which these titles can be downloaded, (3) the MPAA 
issues “warning notices” based on the search results, and (4) with 
very few exceptions, the piracy stops.231  In 2001, there were only 
two challenges to the 54,000 warnings issued.232  For the most part, 
this success is attributable to the fact that the persons targeted are 
not generally considered to be criminals, so a simple warning will 
suffice.233 
C. How, and Where, Can the Pirates Be Stopped? 
1. Domestic Jurisdiction 
Previously, it was thought that “[c]racking down on piracy in 
the United States is relatively straightforward when it comes to 
legal authority,”234 because, under recent copyright law, anyone 
who downloads and hosts a protected file on a home computer 
faces federal prosecution regardless of whether he or she seeks 
financial gain.235 
In the past, media companies have successfully prosecuted: (1) 
a fifteen-year-old hacker who cracked DeCSS;236 (2) a Princeton 
computer science professor who wanted to post a decryption 
 
230 See id. at A9 (the 54,000 bearing a 2001 postmark were distributed as follows: U.S. 
(36,000); Europe, Middle East, and Africa (9,000); Canada (7,000); and Latin America 
(89)).  This author notes as significant that the problem is much greater in Latin America 
than the numbers convey, perhaps because the program utilized by Ranger Online only 
recently became able to search in multiple languages. 
231 See id. at A10. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
234 Id. 
235 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anti-
circumvention provision); Jason Hoppin, The Crackdown on IP Crime, RECORDER, Dec. 
3, 2001, http://www.law.com/regionals/ca/stories/edt1203a.shtml. 
236 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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algorithm on the web,237 and (3) random college students 
downloading pirated videos from the web.238  However, recent 
case law has called into doubt the effectiveness of legal authorities 
to prosecute such copyright crimes.  Most recently, in November  
2002, the California Supreme Court ruled that the real party in 
interest, the California based DVD Copy Control Association, 
could not sue a Texas resident in California for posting DeCSS on 
the Internet.239  This ruling was based on the majority’s holding 
that the defendant, Matthew Pavlovich, did not have sufficient 
minimum contacts with the forum state.240  Therefore, allowing the 
suit to proceed in California would have been tantamount to 
allowing all plaintiffs connected to the auto industry to sue 
defendants in Michigan merely because the industry is based 
there.241  In light of the “effects test” set forth in Calder v. Jones,242 
the future legitimacy of this ruling will likely be called into 
question and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over future 
defendants will likely turn upon the defendant’s intent. 
2. Foreign Jurisdiction 
Enforcement in foreign jurisdictions presents a much greater 
problem.  First, enforcement in this context is more a matter of 
 
237 See Hoppin, supra note 235.  The music industry challenged Prof. Felten to crack its 
proposed CD protection.  Felten succeeded, and when he wanted to present his findings, 
the RIAA threatened to sue him. Id.  He sued for declaratory relief in order to present his 
findings and lost.  See Final Hearing Transcript, Felten v. Recording Indus., (D.N.J 2001) 
(01-CV-2669), http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_ 
transcript.html. 
238 See Hoppin, supra note 235 (discussing how Jason Spatafore was arrested by the 
U.S. Attorney’s office and placed on two years probation for downloading a pirated copy 
of STAR WARS: EPISODE I—THE PHANTOM MENACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999), 
splitting it into several smaller files and reposting it on his own web site).  In this case, 
the government had no trouble haling the defendant into court in California despite his 
status as a citizen of Arizona and despite his claims that he did not know he was breaking 
the law. Id. 
239 See Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002). 
240 See id. at 11–12 (noting that Pavlovich’s sole contact with California was his 
company’s Internet web posting; Pavolvich did not live, work, own property, transact, or 
direct his business activity toward California). 
241 See id. at 13; Chris Marlowe, Antipiracy Ruling Sets Precedent: California’s 
Supreme Court Tackles Jurisdiction Question, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 27, 2002, at 3, 18. 
242 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
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political negotiation than law.  Therefore, to help combat 
international video piracy, the MPAA has set up an extra-judicial 
worldwide Internet enforcement group.243  This group consults 
with a former U.S. Department of Justice attorney who is well-
versed in computer crime, and lobbies the U.S. trade representative 
to help “make sure trading nations are doing their part tracking 
down and prosecuting pirates.”244  Additionally, the MPAA is 
“pushing legislation that would give President Bush authority to 
strike trading treaties without getting prior approval from 
Congress.”245  Whether this approach will be more or less 
successful than enforcing traditional court orders through treaty 
signatories remains to be seen. 
D. Keeping Score: Recent Successes and Failures 
At present, the anti-piracy landscape resembles a battlefield, 
with casualties on both sides.  On the domestic front, although 
Adobe had already prevailed in its civil suit,246 a jury in the United 
 
243 See McClintock, supra note 3, at A10. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Adobe Systems successfully prosecuted the Russian software company, Elcomsoft, 
for publishing software that converts copy-protected eBooks into postscript document 
format [PDF] documents which can easily be printed, copied, and distributed by Internet 
users, despite the fact that the software had legitimate uses.  Adobe’s fear was that the 
Advanced eBook Processor (which removes restrictions on reading and printing from 
encrypted PDF files) would be used to make illegal copies of eBooks, which could be 
distributed through “Napster-like” file sharing networks.  Adobe’s Anti-Piracy Division 
forced Elcomsoft to remove its web site from the Internet, and stop selling the product 
from RegNow (a division of Digital River). See Adobe and the eBook Pirates: Adobe 
Threatens Software Developer over eBook Conversion Software, at 
http://publishing.about.com/library/weekly/aa070501a. htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003). 
The feds later arrested Elcomsoft’s security expert, Dimitry Sklyarov, at Defcon, the 
annual hacker’s convention in Las Vegas, after he delivered his presentation, eBook 
Security: Theory and Practice, which outlined the shortcomings of eBook security.  The 
basis for the arrest were alleged violations of the DMCA. See John Leyden, eBook 
Security Debunker Arrested by Feds, Register, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/ 
55/20444.html (July 17, 2001). 
Mr. Sklyarov’s arrest sparked mass protests by free speech advocates, such as the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation [EFF], which quickly became a public relations disaster 
for Adobe.  Adobe dropped all charges against Mr. Sklyarov in July 2001, and the 
Department of Justice dropped criminal charges in December 2001 in exchange for his 
testimony against his employer, ElcomSoft. See Hoppin, supra note 235. 
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States District Court for the Northern District of California 
acquitted Russian software firm Elcomsoft of criminal charges of 
violating the DMCA by selling a $99 program that allowed users 
to make copies of eBooks247 that had been digitally encrypted.248  
In January 2003, however, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia handed a victory to copyright holders by 
ruling that a subpoena on Internet web service provider Verizon to 
reveal the names of their customers who are allegedly liable for 
copyright infringement was constitutionally enforceable under the 
DMCA.249 
Internationally, courts have been equally divided.  On January 
7, 2003, in a unanimous twenty-five-page ruling, the Oslo City 
Court in Norway acquitted defendant Jon Lech Johansen of 
creating a program to crack the DeCSS so that he could play a 
DVD on his Linux-based computer.250  Interestingly, the case was 
prosecuted as a data break-in rather than as a copyright violation, 
leading Johansen to defend his act of circumvention by stating that 
“[a]s long as you have purchased a DVD legally, then you are 
 
247 An eBook is simply a downloadable version of a book that can be read on handheld 
devices and personal computers. See eBooks, Paradigm Red Shift, at http://www. 
paradigm-redshift.com/ebooks.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003). 
248 See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  See also 
Associated Press, IT Firm Cleared in Copyright Case, Sci-Tech, at http://news.ninemsn. 
com.au/Sci_Tech/story_44118.asp (Dec. 23, 2002) (stating that Elcomsoft could have 
been fined $2 million plus penalties if willfulness had been proven); Reuters, Russian 
Firm Cleared in U.S. Digital Copyright Trial, CNet News, at http://news.cnet.com/ 
investor/news/newsitem/0-9900-1028-20758904-0.html (Dec. 17, 2002 ) (“We accept the 
jury’s verdict. . . .  While disappointed, we are also pleased the judge upheld the 
constitutionality of the [DMCA] and the jurisdiction of the United States to bring these 
cases.” (quoting Kevin Ryan, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California)); Paul 
Sweeting, Acquittal in C’right Trial, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 20, 2002, at 24 (stating that 
the MPAA and Adobe had declined to comment on the verdict); Russian Firm Innocent 
in Copyright Case, United Press International, at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm? 
StoryID=20021217-042812-2354r (Dec. 17, 2002) (“Today’s jury verdict sends a strong 
message to federal prosecutors who believe that tool makers should be thrown in jail just 
because a copyright owner doesn’t like the tools they build.” (quoting Fred von 
Lohmann, an intellectual property lawyer with the EFF)). 
249 See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-0323, 2003 WL 141147, *17 
(D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2003); Justin Oppelaar, Pirates Face Music, Verizon Must Reveal 
Swappers’ ID, Judge Sez, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 22, 2003, at 8. 
250 See Associated Press, Teen Acquitted in DVD Hack Case: Norwegian Court Deals 
Blow to Hollywood’s Copyright Fight, MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/856102. 
asp (Jan. 7, 2003). 
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allowed to decode it with any equipment and can’t be forced to buy 
any specific equipment.”251  Prosecutors have since appealed the 
ruling.252  Conversely, on January 23, 2002 in the United 
Kingdom, the High Court, Chancery Division, held that Sony had 
established liability for circumventing the DVD CSS under section 
296 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998, after 
defendant Edmunds of Channel Technology had imported from 
Russia and sold the “Messiah” chip, which allows pirated games 
and pornography to be played on Sony’s Playstation 2.253 
E. Non-Legal Solutions: Establishing a Piracy Equilibrium 
Due to the difficulty in tracking down and enforcing judgments 
in a global environment, the most apt solution is likely to fall 
outside the legal realm.  This solution, based on sound business 
principles and common sense, is governed by the principle that 
people will not expend great effort or suffer the threat of legal 
consequences if they can receive a product at a reasonable price.  
Therefore, it is necessary for film studios to strike a reasonable 
balance of interests by reducing prices to the point at which their 
losses to piracy will be tolerable yet they will still receive a 
reasonable return on their investment, thus creating a “piracy 
equilibrium.” 
The first steps toward a piracy equilibrium have already been 
established.  On November 11, 2002, MGM, Paramount, Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, Universal, and Warner Bros. launched 
Movielink as a practical, legal alternative to piracy.254  The 
 
251 Id. 
252 See Associated Press, Alleged DVD Hacker’s Acquittal to Be Appealed, USA 
TODAY, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-01-20-dvd-appeal_x.htm 
(Jan. 20, 2003). 
253 See Sony Computer Enter. v. Owen, [2002] E.M.L.R. 34, at 744–45 (Ch. 2002). 
254 See Marlowe & Bond, supra note 72 (in which Josh Bernoff, Forrester Research 
principal analyst is said to believe that Movielink resulted from “fears of the possible 
Napsterization of the film industry”); Fritz, supra note 74 (stating “Movielink’s primary 
purpose, as some people involved in the project admit, is to demonstrate that the studios 
are providing a legal alternative for Internet movie pirates.”); Sullivan, supra note 204 
(stating Movielink is “a legal alternative to pirate film downloading”); Risky Business? 
New On-Demand Digital Movies May Not Be Pirate Proof, supra note 75 (stating that 
Movielink’s planned encryption technology, high-quality video, and low download fees 
would help to prevent the e-piracy of such films as LARA CROFT: TOMB RAIDER 
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purpose was to unify the fight against online piracy, founded on 
the belief that people would choose to be law-abiding if presented 
with a reasonable alternative.255  This realistic approach may help 
solve the immediate problem of piracy by reducing the incentive 
for netizens to seek out unauthorized copies.  However, 
establishing a piracy equilibrium and ensuring studios the right and 
ability to rent their videos directly to the public under the new 
distribution model does not ensure that Talent will receive 
equitable treatment.  In a typical studio contract, Talent bargains 
for gross participation and residuals.256 
F. What Piracy Means for Talent Participants 
Piracy presents a threat to both studios and Talent.  It undercuts 
their mutual financial base and threatens the very core of creative 
productivity protected by the U.S. Constitution.257 
While this author supports strong encryption and cannot 
condemn piracy enough,258 gloomy predictions that piracy will 
destroy the industry have not come true, even though perfect 
digital copies of music have been available for over ten years. 
Therefore, piracy really presents a threat profit participants 
because studios will likely treat piracy as a breakage allowance 
deducted from gross receipts, and pass the loss on to the profit 
participants.  This is especially true if the income is calculated 
after receipts are taken from an inter-company affiliate distributor.  
If the affiliate distributes the video over the Internet, the affiliate 
 
(Paramount 2001), PLANET OF THE APES (Twentieth Century Fox 2001), and PEARL 
HARBOR (Touchstone 2001) which occurred within days of their theatrical premieres). 
255 See id.  While encryption technology experts believe the Windows-based format is 
vulnerable to piracy and that it would be relatively simple to capture the films 
permanently, Warner Brothers CEO Barry Meyer said in this article that he believes 
“human nature is not predisposed towards piracy.” 
256 Gross participations are bargained-for, whereas, if the picture is made by a guild 
signatory, minimum percentages based on gross profits for international video are 
established by the respective guilds: i.e., the WGA, DGA, and SAG in their respective 
Minimum Basic Agreements. See, e.g., WGA, supra note 17, at 161–71 (1998). See also 
Tulchin, supra note 48. 
257 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
258 See Konrad Gatien, How Encryption and National Security Will Affect the Future of 
Digital Film Distribution, 8 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 229 (2001). 
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will not incur the loss; rather, it will keep its share of rentals and 
report the loss to the studio.  The studio will then write this loss 
down against the deemed royalty posted to gross receipts that are 
figured into profit participations.  Therefore, this model will t 
allow the studio to sequester the lion’s share of gross receipts in its 
affiliate, and then write down the royalties it receives from its 
affiliate by the amount lost to piracy.  Again, the risk and the loss 
will be passed on to those least able to shoulder the burden—the 
Talent—while the studios will have successfully insulated 
themselves from harm through superior bargaining power and 
clever business models. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2000, the annual cost for the physical distribution of all 
films worldwide from all studios was $1.5 billion—approximately 
twenty percent of reported gross revenues.  The loss from content 
aggregator agreements is equally significant.259  Under the 
traditional model, studios were forced to continue these 
debilitating relationships; that is, it was impractical for studios to 
open their own distribution networks because consumers would 
demand greater freedom of choice.  However, in the Information 
Age, this concern has vanished.  Now, the greatest concerns are 
quality and speed.  Telecom companies, in association with the 
major motion picture studios, are rushing to solve both 
problems.260  Congress has also been proactive in legislating and 
providing funds to help private companies grapple with change.261 
Certainly, standards will be set.  It won’t be long before micro-
fast broadband carrying a compressed digital signal will be linked 
to high definition television in the home.  Propelled by strong 
economic incentives, the movement towards video distribution via 
 
259 See WAYNE LEVIN, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION LAW 17 (2002). 
260 See Cameron Hurst, True Video on Demand Is Possible over the Internet . . . Really!, 
Home Toys, at http://www.hometoys.com/htinews/oct01/articles/uniview/hurst.htm (Oct. 
2001). 
261 See Broadband Internet Access Act of 2003, H.R. 267, 108th Cong. (2003). See also 
Doug Johnson, Tech Policy in 2002, Vision, at www.ce.org/publications/vision/2002/ 
aprmayjun/p5.asp?bc=bak&year=2002 (last visited Feb. 8, 2003). 
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the Internet is powerful.  The traditional method of physical 
distribution required a vast infrastructure and was costly, 
cumbersome, and remarkably inefficient.  Digital video 
distribution, on the other hand, requires only that the studio 
maintain enough servers to make their films available to the public 
I  It is therefore potentially much more lucrative. 
The awful truth is that “only about 5% of the major 
studio/distribution deals actually result in the payment of net 
profits to anyone, regardless of how much money the film makes 
(that’s the best estimate of a profit participation auditor who is out 
there on the front lines every day, auditing the studio books).”262  
With unprecedented media conglomeration, the current situation 
puts unequal bargaining power together with an obligation of 
fairness toward others, and in to the hands of those least likely to 
exercise it. 
This blatant profit-reaping by film studios is similar to the 
Robber Barons of the late 1800s and early 1900s who President 
Theodore Roosevelt called the “malefactors of great wealth.”263  
These men, C. Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, J.P. Morgan and Jacob 
Schiff, have been characterized by historians as “masters of trick 
and deceit,” and as “Mephistopheles,” men who practiced “pillage, 
fraud, and distortion.”264  Their flagrant abuse of power led 
Roosevelt to adopt “a public and political role for the government 
in antitrust [to] control, curb, and break-up large private 
concentrations of economic power.”265 
If past behavior is any indication, the studios are likely to 
continue to act monopolistically, even if the courts have not yet 
examined, and attorney generals not yet prosecuted their practices 
under the strict letter of the law.  Studios are unlikely to report 
profits accurately.  Instead they will force weaker bargaining 
parties with legitimate claims into an occasional settlement, rather 
 
262 JOHN W. CONES, THE FEATURE FILM DISTRIBUTION DEAL (1996). 
263 J. Bradford DeLong, Robber Barons, at http://econ161.berkeley.edu/Econ_Articles/ 
carnegie/delong_moscow_paper2.html (Jan. 1, 1998). 
264 Negative Stereotype of the “Robber Baron”, at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/soc/ 
robber-barons.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) (citing MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER 
BARONS (1938)). 
265 DeLong, supra note 263. 
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than distribute what could be fairly substantial profits to all Talent 
participants industry-wide. 
In conclusion, because it is not in the studios’ financial interest 
to be generous, or to ensure that profits are distributed equitably, 
both the legislature and the courts must step in to ensure that 
studios live up to their contractual obligations of good faith and 
fair dealing.  A net profit definition that results in no profit is 
manifestly unjust, causes unnecessary litigation, wastes judicial 
resources, and may dry up the Talent pool for the future.266 
 
 
266 See JAMES JAEGER, THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCER’S MANUAL (1998). 
